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ABSTRACT
SEARCHING UNDER STRESS: ANXIETY AND SELECTIVE 
INFORMATION EXPOSURE 
by
Melissa K. Surawski 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2007
For centuries, political philosophers have argued that emotion clouds rational 
judgment and should be avoided at all costs. In light of advances made in the fields of 
social cognition, political science, and social psychology, however, the question of how 
affective states work in conjunction with cognitive processes has been approached anew, 
and interesting patterns have emerged in the data. They theory of affective intelligence 
(Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000) posits that emotional arousal, particularly anxiety, 
alerts organisms to gather and evaluate information from the environment that can be 
useful for self-protection. On the other hand, terror management theory (Solomon, 
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002) predicts that anxious individuals will protect 
themselves from information that is death-related or that threatens their worldview. The 
primary purpose of this study was to determine if preference for information exposure 
changes following a threat Anxiety was manipulated through faux online news articles 
about nuclear terrorism. After reading the articles, participants spent time exploring a 
website that contained links to further information about terrorism, some of which 
reassured the participants of their safety, some of which further threatened their sense of 
well-being. The order in which the links were clicked and the amount of time spent on 
each webpage was recorded for each participant Additionally, participants completed
x
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the Need for Evaluation Scale (Jarvis & Petty, 1996), the Miller Behavioral Style Scale 
(Miller, 1987), and the Brief Big Five Personality Inventory (Gosling, Renfrew, & Swann, 
2003) in order to assess individual differences. Allhough anxiety increased for 
participants reading an unsafe message about nuclear power, no differences were found 
between the experimental groups in their preference for information. Overall, 
participants strongly preferred threatening information, spending roughly three times as 
long on the threatening websites than on reassuring websites. While high scores on the 
Need for Evaluation scale predicted less time spent on the threatening websites, the other 
individual difference measures failed to predict level of information exposure. Overall, 
the results of this study indicate that following a threat, the preference for information 
that further heightens anxiety is stronger than the preference for information that would 
assuage fear.
xi
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
American citizens experienced tremendous emotional upheaval from a series of 
events that began with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
in the fall o f 2001 and came to include the mailing of anthrax to members o f Congress, 
thirteen sniper attacks on innocent bystanders in the Washington, D.C. area, and a war in 
Afghanistan. Shortly after, the debate over the invasion o f Iraq, which centered around 
the security threat posed by Saddam Hussein, came to dominate media airwaves. By the 
time the 2004 presidential campaign season had begun, political scientists, pundits, 
psychologists, and the lay public alike wondered how the new focus on homeland 
security would impact voters’ decisions. In fact, this question contributed to the attempt 
by pollsters to predict the vote outcomes of a newly identified set o f swing voters -  
“security moms” -  whose concern with national security not only closed the gender gap 
in attitudes toward military spending, but even took precedence over their concern with 
civil liberties (Tumulty, Novak, Barnes, Baron, Bower, Camey, Healy, Sieger, & 
Underwood, 2003). Just as the question of how these women would behave after their 
political habits were abandoned in favor o f rational information processing that enabled 
them to choose the candidate who could keep their families safe, the question of how 
voters would react in the face o f another terrorist attack occurring immediately before the 
elections was also raised. Some speculated that a second attack preceding the election
1
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
would highlight incumbent George W. Bush’s incompetence and failure to protect the 
nation, while others argued that such an attack would again result in the same wave of 
nationalism and support for the President that occurred after the 2001 attacks. In short, a 
consensus that fear and anxiety would somehow influence the behavior o f voters seemed 
to exist, but an understanding o f exactly how these emotions would influence their 
thoughts and behavior remained elusive.
Of course, the intersection o f emotion and reason in the domain o f politics has 
been a question of concern before the socio-political events occurring at the inception of 
the second millennium. Anaxagoras, some time around 450 B.C.E., posited that emotions 
hinder the search for truth, and that the mind can and should prevent passion from 
affecting thought and behavior. This ideal served as the basis for the doctrine of stoicism 
which came to dominate the history of Western political thought (Marcus, Neuman, & 
MacKuen, 2000). Political theorists, particularly enlightenment thinkers such as Locke 
and Rousseau, have celebrated the human capacity to weigh the positive and negative 
consequences of a variety o f possible actions in a logical manner, and argued for the 
formation o f social institutions that allow citizens the freedom to use this capacity. These 
thinkers -  and the founders of modem democracies that they, in turn, influenced - 
believed that civic engagement should involve a careful and deliberate search for 
unbiased information about political issues, a period o f reflection during which the 
information is evaluated, and then finally a decision about which course of action (i.e., 
voting for a particular candidate) would best meet the goals o f the individual. Even 
today, the idea o f human beings as efficient and rational information processors is 
prevalent in political science and economics. However, this view o f cognition is only a
2
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prescription and, given the research findings in cognitive psychology and related 
disciplines, not likely to be accurate.
In the late 1940s and 1950s, Herbert Simon challenged the idea that people 
attempt to maximize their self-interest by logically evaluating all available information 
and making decisions accordingly (e.g., Simon, 1955). To appreciate his point, consider 
for a second the amount o f information that is available in the environment during a 
typical election campaign. Not only are there multiple candidates concurrently vying for 
seats in multiple elections, there are multiple issues on which the candidates can vary. It 
would be beyond the capacity o f working memory to consider every piece o f information 
to which an individual was exposed, let alone to evaluate this information against the 
individual’s goals along with the consideration o f the probability that certain 
consequences would result from the action taken. A person trying to decide between John 
Kerry and George W. Bush in 2004, for example, would have to know where each 
candidate stood on a number of issues, determine which candidate’s positions are most 
aligned with his or her own positions, all while weighing the likelihood that significant 
change on the issue could occur over the time span in which the chosen candidate was in 
office. O f course, pen and paper could be used in order to help summarize the 
information, but that would require a degree of motivation that probably does not 
characterize most voters. Instead, Simon contended that the process o f human judgment 
can best be described as “satisficing” -  the attempt to identify an outcome that may 
satisfy but will at least suffice to meet some objective.
In 1964, Philip Converse, pulling on Simon’s theory o f bounded rationality, wrote 
an influential chapter in which he identified further restrictions on voter’s ability to make
3
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carefully reasoned decisions about which candidates to support.. Psychological 
constraints such as the framing of political messages in terms of superordinate values (for 
example, “social justice”) could enable voters to bind together a multitude of attitudes 
and beliefs that may not entirely be consistent with each other. Additionally, social 
constraints such as the simplified way in which political information is presented to the 
public will also affect how political information is encoded and evaluated in the minds of 
voters.
Merely a few years after the publication o f Converse’s chapter, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982) began their ground-breaking work on the identification of the biases and 
heuristics prevalent in human cognition that constrain rationality. Experimental studies 
demonstrated that people prefer risky political candidates when potential policy outcomes 
are described as gains, while risk-averse candidates are more popular when these same 
policy outcomes are presented in terms of losses. Similarly, support for the Equal Rights 
Amendment was stronger among experimental participants who read a description that 
framed the amendment in terms of eliminating discrimination (a loss frame), than among 
participants who read a description that framed the issue in terms o f improving women’s 
rights (a gain frame). Furthermore, when experimental participants were presented with a 
description o f a policy currently in place and a proposed amendment to that policy, they 
overwhelmingly chose to keep the status quo -  regardless of which policy was described 
as current and which policy was described as the amendment (Quattrone & Tversky, 
1988). Clearly, these and similar findings present a challenge to the prescriptive models 
o f rational political thought.
4
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Another challenge to the classical ideal of the rational political actor is the 
influence o f emotion. Throughout the history of Western thought, passion has been 
viewed as an agent that serves only to corrupt logic -  a force that distracts and misleads 
the mind away from rationality. This view o f emotion, though, like the view that civic 
engagement should be based on reason is also merely an ideology, and fails to describe 
the processes that actually underlie political cognition. To assume that people do not 
allow their emotions to affect their thinking simply because philosophers have 
condemned it is to misunderstand the nature of human cognition. In 1971, Carroll Izard 
wrote:
“In general, emotions [have been viewed] as transient and troublesome 
states serving no really important purpose. The rational man ideology 
has succeeded in hiding from man his full nature.. .the human being is 
neurophysiological, motoric, emotional, and cognitive. To drop out 
any o f these components would be to make the organism less than 
human, not more than human, as the rational man ideology puts it” (p.
396).
In order to advance the understanding of political cognition, then, its nature as 
both boundedly rational and emotional must be recognized. However, the traditional 
conception of the interplay of emotion and reason must be re-examined. Instead of 
hindering rationality, emotion can be viewed as an aid to it. If learning information about 
multiple candidates, issues, and elections is a substantial cognitive burden, then citizens 
may decide to gather this information only when they are sufficiently motivated to do so. 
What drives this motivation is emotional investment with the issues. In other words, 
feeling strongly about an issue may not preclude the ability to think rationally, it instead 
may motivate an individual to search for and evaluate information. Passion may not be 
the enemy o f reason.
5
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Interestingly, two theories have been advanced in the psychology and political 
science literatures regarding the role of emotion as a motivating factor in the search for 
and evaluation of further information about an issue. Central to both theories is the 
motivating power o f anxiety. While one theory -  the theory o f affective intelligence, 
(Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000) - posits that anxiety is the friend o f reason and 
motivates citizens to learn and engage, the other, terror management theory (Pyszczynski, 
Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003) is more aligned with the classical position that strong 
emotions cloud judgment. This latter theory is intuitively appealing on account of the 
many examples that can easily be brought to mind o f people being “carried away” by 
their emotions. Think, for instance, o f radical pro-life activists who so fervently believe 
that fetuses have a right to life that they are willing to kill clinic staffers -  an action that 
does not logically follow from the belief that life should be protected. Furthermore, the 
conjecture that anxiety debilitates rational thought is consistent with the backlash 
movement toward “moral values” that occurred after the string o f anxiety-provoking 
events that began with the attack on the World Trade Center in New York. Some political 
theorists have attributed the movement toward the right to an increased psychological 
need to affirm that the world operates in predictable ways that can be understood and 
controlled.
The present study, then, is an attempt to reconcile these two competing theories 
about the role o f affect -  specifically, anxiety - on the motivation to seek out and evaluate 
information about a political issue. Although both the theory o f affective intelligence and 
the terror management theory have received considerable attention in the fields of 
political science and psychology respectively, to date, they have not been empirically
6
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compared. In the following pages, both theories will be described in detail and their 
relevant literatures will be reviewed. Next, methodological issues common to both bodies 
of literature will be discussed, and ways in which these issues can be addressed will be 
proposed. Finally, the possibility that quantifiable individual differences exist on the 
ability o f anxiety to motivate behavior will be addressed, along with the implications that 
these differences, if  found, would have on the predictive validity of each theory. A 
comprehensive understanding cannot be achieved, however, without first reviewing the 
emotion literature that was used to formulate the current theories o f emotion and political 
behavior.
Emotion
For the first time in 1998, the Handbook o f  Social Psychology included a chapter 
on emotion. In the opening paragraphs, Robert Zajonc bemoans two aspects o f the 
history of emotion research; first, emotion researchers are more likely to approach the 
topic from within the context o f their own sub-discipline: developmentalists are 
interested in understanding emotional development and regulation; social psychologists 
might be interested in the influence of affect on social behavior, such as in mobs or 
crowds; while cognitive psychologists might study the impact of emotion on memory. 
Since emotion researchers are coming at the problem of understanding emotion from very 
specific backgrounds and seek to answer very specific questions, the nature o f the 
literature on emotions is patchy, somewhat disorganized, and fails to offer a 
comprehensive theory. Second, Zajonc bemoans the relative paucity o f work that has 
been done on emotion. These two points prompt Zajonc to argue that the entire contents
7
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of his chapter and each o f the references contained within it are needed to achieve only 
the most basic understanding of the function, structure,, and effects o f emotion.
Nevertheless, such a definition is not practical, and so I will adopt Caroll Izard’s 
definition of emotion: “An emotion is experienced as a feeling that motivates, organizes, 
and guides perceptions, thoughts, and actions” (Izard, 1991, p. 14). The motivating power 
of emotion directs action toward some goal; in rage, for example, the goal might be to 
remove the source of frustration, while in disgust the goal might be to retreat from a 
potentially toxic stimulus. Feeling a particular emotion will also color experience. To a 
sad individual, there is no end to morose events, while a happy individual may perceive 
delight in almost anything she encounters. The theory o f how emotions evolved will help 
to illuminate these functional components of emotion.
Emotion is believed by many to have evolved from approach-avoidance reactions 
shared by even the simplest forms of life (Izard, 1991). The abilities to discern danger 
from sustenance and to repel from or approach them are important for survival, well­
being, and reproduction. Emotions gradually evolved with phylogenetic complexity, 
which requires longer periods o f time for an organism to reach maturity. Infants’ ability 
to communicate their internal state to their caretakers by crying, for example, increases 
the chances that their physiological needs will be met, while smiling and cooing cements 
the emotional bond between infant and caretaker, further ensuring that the infant will 
receive attention and care. Some argue, then, that infants’ dependence on others 
contributed to the development o f discrete emotions. This evolutionary theory of 
emotion has been supported by the finding that people o f seemingly all cultures can 
recognize and identify the emotions associated with particular facial expressions
8
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(Darwin, 1899; Izard, 1971; Ekman & Friesen, 1978), suggesting a common biological 
heritage.
While most researchers would contend that emotions have evolved to help 
organisms meet their physiological needs, there is not much consensus on the way 
emotions are structured or their specific functions. For the sake o f brevity, the only 
approaches to understanding the structure of emotion to be discussed here will be those 
that receive the most attention and support in the literature, the dimensional approach and 
the differential approach (for a review o f psychoanalytic theories o f emotion, see Shapiro 
& Emde, 1993; for a review o f self-theories see Dweck, 1991; for a review of the 
cognitive theories literature see Lazarus, 1995).
The dimensional theories o f emotion have in common the position that emotions 
can be located on one or more continua. Spencer (1890, as cited in Izard, 1979), the first 
to argue this point, claimed that all emotions fell along a single pleasantness- 
unpleasantness dimension. Later, Wundt (1896, as cited in Izard, 1979) included 
Spencer’s demarcation in his own three-factor dimensional theory which also included 
the dimensions o f relaxation-tension and calm-excitement. Duffy’s (1962) theory 
includes a dimension of arousal, similar to Wundt’s dimension o f calm-excitement, and a 
positive-negative dimension. More recently, Russell (1980), Larsen and Diener (1992) 
and Reisenzein (1994) have found evidence suggesting that emotions fall along two 
dimensions, one of pleasure-displeasure and one of energy that ranges from sleep to 
frenetic arousal. Watson and Tellegren (1985) also proposed independent positive and 
negative dimensions along with an activation dimension.
9
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Despite the differences, some researchers are beginning to argue that a great deal 
of overlap exists in the dimensions across theories (Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1999; 
Yik, Russell, & Barrett, 1999), and that the dimensions are simply labeled differently. In 
fact, James Russell (2003) has recently argued that many of the differences that exist 
among dimensional theories can be traced back to semantics -  that the words that we use 
to describe emotion are not differentiated enough to cover the entire range o f affective 
experiences. To illustrate this point, he describes the very different types o f fear in the 
same individual, Alice. First she encounters a bear in the woods, is frightened, and flees 
to safety. In another example, Alice is sitting in a theatre watching the movie Alien. She 
is frightened, but she is fully absorbed in the movie and does not run from it. In another 
iteration, Alice is afraid that she will miss her flight and so she speeds toward the airport. 
These situations all seem to represent different phenomenological experiences of 
approach and avoidance, yet they can all be described by the word “fear.”
Critics of this approach, then, argue that the use o f common language constrains 
the scientific understanding of emotion. As an alternative, many researchers who do not 
work within the context o f the dimensional theories are likely to support a discrete or 
basic approach to emotion. These theories are characterized by the belief that each 
emotion is its own unique physiological and phenomenological state.
Ekman (1999) has outlined the characteristics that define basic emotions. First, 
basic emotions must have distinctive universal signals. Basic emotions can be 
nonverbally communicated and understood in all cultures, which does seem to be the 
case. Second, specific physiological arousal patterns must exist for each of the basic 
emotions, although Ekman concedes that the evidence is still converging on this point.
10
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
Third, a sub-conscious appraisal system must exist that arouses the particular emotion in 
response to a stimulus, again a point that needs to be further researched but is supported 
by several theorists’ adoption o f this point in their own explanations o f basic emotions. 
Fourth, there must be some common elements to the situations that arouse the basic 
emotions, a logical conjecture that has found support in studies, for example, that have 
found that the loss o f loved ones causes sadness across cultures.
Ekman’s own list of basic emotions includes anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, 
and surprise. Izard (1971) includes anger, disgust, contempt, distress, fear, guilt, interest, 
joy, shame, and surprise. Frijda (1986) argues that desire, happiness, interest, surprise, 
wonder, and sorrow comprise the basic emotions, while Plutchik’s (1962) list contains 
acceptance, anger, anticipation, disgust, joy, fear, sadness, and surprise. Generally, these 
researchers believe that the basic emotions combine in various ways to produce the vast 
range of human emotional experience.
It appears that the discrete theorists work largely separately from the dimensional 
theorists in the attempt to understand the structure o f emotion. Little overlap can be found 
in the literature. Feldman Barrett and Russell (1999), who work within the dimensional 
approach, suggested that emotions might be experiences comprised o f many distinct 
processes that originate in different parts of the brain, and the experience of feeling a 
particular emotion is the result of the integration of these processes. This view likely 
represents the starting point for both the dimensional and discrete theories of emotion, 
and so perhaps abiding by Russell’s suggestion to inhibit the use o f common language in 
emotion research will establish a common ground in the literature.
11
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Another problem related to structure o f emotion is the issue o f state and trait 
emotion. Some emotional experiences are fleeting, while others last for significantly 
longer periods o f time (Cattell & Scheier, 1961). Although state and trait emotion are not 
thought to differ in their phenomenological experience, state emotion is thought to have a 
greater range o f intensity than trait emotion. Izard (1991) argued that trait emotion may 
be due to low neurological thresholds for particular emotions. Although the present study 
is primarily interested in state emotion, it will be necessary to measure and control for 
participants’ levels o f trait emotion.
Emotions have a variety of physiological and psychological effects. 
Physiologically, emotion activates the autonomic nervous system which releases 
hormones and other messengers which, in turn, have a variety o f further influences, 
including the speeding up or slowing down of breathing and the heart, among other 
things. These changes help the body respond quickly to threat (Frijda, 1988). There is 
also substantial evidence that emotional state can influence the functioning of the 
immune system. Prolonged periods o f stress or negative emotion are associated with 
decreased immune functioning (Ader & Cohen, 1985).
Emotion can have effects at the perceptual level as well. In a now classic study, 
Izard, Naglar, Randally, & Fox (1965) staged either a pleasant or unpleasant encounter 
with an experimenter before showing participants faces exhibiting positive or negative 
expressions in a stereoscope (a device that allows a separate image to be viewed by each 
eye). Participants who were experiencing negative emotion from the unpleasant 
encounter reported seeing more faces with negative expressions, while the opposite 
pattern was true for participants who experienced a pleasant encounter.
12
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Questions about the effect of emotion on cognition have generated much research. 
Cognitive psychologists have found evidence that individuals encode new information 
into an associative network that contains information about his or her current affective 
state; better recall, therefore, is expected for information when the individual is in a 
similar mood to the time when the information was initially encoded (Bower, 1981). Isen 
(1987) found that positive emotional states are more conducive for thinking creatively.
The literature on the impact o f emotion on cognition is large, and more of it will 
be reviewed with specific reference to anxiety within the specific discussions of the 
theory o f affective intelligence and terror management theory. To summarize this brief 
overview o f the emotion literature: there is much disagreement over the structure of 
emotion, but most theorists agree that it has evolved to help organisms prepare to fight, 
flight, mate, or care for offspring, all activities that enhance survival o f the species. 
Emotion has been found to have pervasive physiological and cognitive effects, and much 
more research is needed in order to fully understand these effects, particularly research 
that incorporates methodology beyond simple reaction time measures in order to facilitate 
understanding of how anxiety influences more complex cognitive tasks, such as choosing 
news media. Although more work on emotion is needed, affective intelligence and terror 
management theorists have both drawn on the emotion literature to support their ideas; in 
the following pages their theories will be presented, along with relevant studies that 
support or disconfirm their hypotheses.
13
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The Theory of Affective Intelligence
In 1993, political scientists George Marcus and Michael MacKuen published a 
paper in American Political Science Review in which they presented support for the 
hypothesis that two different emotions -  anxiety and enthusiasm -  had very different 
influences on perception and behavior.
Drawing from an evolutionary perspective in which anxiety is considered to be 
adaptive on account o f its ability to motivate organisms to attend to their environment, 
thus enabling them to detect danger, Marcus and MacKuen were attempting to test the 
hypothesis that feeling anxious about political events and candidates will motivate 
citizens to search for further information about them. Using data from the 1980 American 
National Election Studies (ANES), these authors were able to produce four significant 
findings:
First, they demonstrated that anxiety and enthusiasm for learning political 
information and engaging in politics are separate and distinct emotional responses to 
candidates. The 1980 ANES asked respondents if  each o f the presidential candidates had 
ever made them felt “angry”, “hopeful”, “afraid of him”, “proud”, “disgusted”, 
“sympathetic toward him”, and “uneasy.” Although anxiety was not one o f the adjectives 
included by the ANES staff, Marcus and MacKuen reasoned that the terms afraid, 
uneasy, anger, and disgust would approximate the affective state they were trying to 
capture. Factor analysis with varimax rotation o f a principal factor solution did reveal 
two factors that were consistent with their hypotheses: one factor was correlated with the 
terms hopeful, proud, and sympathetic toward the candidate, and a second factor
14
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correlated with the terms anger, afraid, disgust, and unease. If these two factors were 
merely opposite endpoints o f the same approach-avoidance continuum, then they would 
not be expected to relate orthogonally to each other. In fact, however, they do. Marcus 
and MacKuen interpreted this finding as disconfirming evidence for a simple valence 
view o f emotion.
In order to test further hypotheses that anxiety and enthusiasm have different 
effects on behavior, the question of how closely the emotions o f private citizens are 
related to socio-political events had to be addressed first. After all, if  there was no 
relation between reported affect and concurrent political events, any attempt to measure 
the effect of emotion on the learning of political information would be superfluous. This 
question o f whether or not citizens experience emotional reactions that change along with 
the political landscape comprised the second study of Marcus and MacKuen’s 1993 
paper. The authors tracked the rate at which each o f the emotional terms (the same terms 
used in the first study) were volunteered by respondents participating in three different 
waves of the ANES, and found significant changes in levels o f perceived enthusiasm and 
anxiety about each candidate corresponded closely with a number o f events relative to the 
campaign. For example, in January 1980, 40% of the ANES respondents volunteered 
terms such as uneasy or disgusted to describe their emotional reactions to Carter. 
Following an inflation scare, rising unemployment levels, and the hostage crisis, 
however, the number of respondents reporting they felt uneasy or disgusted increased to 
53%.
Experimental evidence supports the existence of emotional reactions to political 
events as well. Marcus, Wood, and Theiss-Morse, (1998) presented subjects with
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information about political groups that they had previously described as being offensive. 
The participants were then presented with different messages about the types o f activities 
that the group engaged in: one message portrayed the actions as orderly and responsible, 
while the other message described the actions o f the group as violent and unruly. After 
the participants were exposed to the message, they were asked to complete a mood scale. 
Additionally, some of the participants provided physiological measurements of their 
arousal. As predicted, the participants who were exposed to the violent and unruly 
message reported (and demonstrated physiologically) higher levels o f anxiety and arousal 
than participants who had been exposed to the benign message.
Once anxiety and enthusiasm were demonstrated to be distinct emotional systems 
and that citizens do, indeed, experience them in reaction to political events, the 
hypothesis that anxiety and enthusiasm have different motivational effects on political 
behavior could be tested. In Marcus and MacKuen’s third study, vote choice was 
regressed on anxiety and enthusiasm scores. In all three waves o f the 1980 ANES, 
enthusiasm for the candidate predicted vote choice, but anxiety did not have an effect. 
These two emotions, then, do not appear to function the same way as enthusiasm in 
political cognition.
In their fourth study, Marcus and MacKuen tested the hypothesis that feeling 
anxious is associated with decreased identification with a political party. According to 
evolutionary theory, anxiety is triggered by a perceived threat in the environment and 
disrupts ongoing activity so that the organism can re-allocate resources to self-protection. 
Feeling anxious about politics, Marcus and MacKuen argued, should motivate the voter 
to decrease his or her reliance on party identification as an automatic method for
16
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assessing political beliefs, and increase the search for objective information. A 
regression model built to test this hypothesis, did, in fact, reveal this pattern in the data: 
anxious voters are less likely to rely on habit. Furthermore, respondents who reported 
feeling anxious about the candidates were also more likely to correctly place Reagan to 
the right of Carter on three policy issues, a finding that demonstrates the motivation to 
seek out and learn new information.
To summarize their findings, then, Marcus and MacKuen demonstrated the 
distinct effect o f two different emotions -  enthusiasm and anxiety -  on how people 
approach politics. Feeling enthusiastic about a candidate motivates people to vote and 
participate in politics, while feeling anxious motivates people to spend more time and 
energy learning about political events. The major contribution o f these studies, then, is 
twofold: first, they provided some of the first empirical evidence that emotion does 
affect how individual citizens react to political information -  regardless of the rational 
man ideology sustained by political philosophers for centuries. Second, they implied that 
the classical view of emotion as detrimental to rational thought is incorrect; instead, 
heightened anxiety seems to prod the voter into more deliberate consideration o f the 
information available to him or her in the environment.
Marcus and MacKuen’s paper has received considerable attention in the field of 
political psychology. It has been included in a number of collections o f classic readings, 
such as the Oxford Handbook o f  Political Psychology edited by Sears, Huddy, and Jervis 
(2003), recent compilation edited by Jost and Sidanius (2004), among other appearances 
in edited books and annual reviews. The paper, not surprisingly, has also been central to 
the careers o f the authors, who have expanded their original 1993 findings about the
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function o f emotion in political behavior into a comprehensive theory, the theory of 
affective intelligence.
Affective intelligence may seem like an odd name for a theory that attempts to 
describe the impact o f emotional reactions on specifically political behavior -  particularly 
given the separate and distinct research on emotional intelligence which has been of 
interest to personality psychologists. What George Marcus, Michael MacKuen, and their 
colleague Russell Neuman hoped to express with that title is the idea that emotion and 
reason are not mutually exclusive; that affect can enhance intelligent thinking (Marcus, 
Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000).
The theory, essentially, is as follows: two different neurological sub-systems 
exist within the limbic systems that regulate conscious awareness. The first system, 
labeled the disposition system, has two functions. First, it is the seat o f procedural 
memory for automatic, habitual behaviors. Second, it monitors the ability of the body to 
meet the demands that are being placed on it. It notices, for example, the level o f energy 
that is available to be consumed and the relative difficulty of the task at hand. When the 
disposition system has determined that the organism can effectively perform the task, 
emotions of satisfaction and enthusiasm are aroused in the individual. However, when 
the disposition has detected that there is a mismatch between the amount of resources 
needed and the amount o f resources available to complete the task, feelings of depression 
and frustration are aroused. These feelings are adaptive because they prevent the 
organism from engaging in behavior that may ultimately be harmful to it. Take, for 
example, a runner who is training for the marathon. It is unlikely that she will be able to 
run the full 26 miles on the exact day that she decides to take up running, and if she were
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to force her body to do so, she would likely end up injured. Marcus, Neuman, and 
MacKuen (2000) argue that the disposition system enables the runner to experience 
frustration and despair that signals she should not attempt to run 26 miles, and she would 
stop before her body is harmed. The disposition system, then, underlies the experience 
and motivation associated with the emotion of enthusiasm, which in turn enables the 
organism to know when to engage in a task and when to quit.
The dispositional system is relevant to the study of political behavior because it 
describes the conditions under which citizens will participate in politics. When they are 
feeling particularly enthusiastic about a candidate because that candidate seems 
especially able to deliver desired outcomes, citizens will be more likely to go to the polls 
or wave a sign on a street comer. They feel enthusiastic about politics because they have 
sensed that their goals can be met by a particular candidate or political group. On the 
other hand, citizens will fail to turn out on Election Day if  they fail to perceive the 
candidates as being able to deliver the outcomes in which they are interested. In this 
scenario, citizens become frustrated by the government’s inability to meet their needs, 
and for this reason, voting is pointless.
The dispositional system cannot be the only system exerting an effect on political 
behavior, however. If  it were, election results could be easily predicted by the degree of 
enthusiasm that various candidates and groups inspire in their constituents, and the 
emotional reactions to specific political events would ultimately have no effect. Attempts 
to persuade voters to reconsider their habitual positions would be fruitless because there 
would be no mechanism that would disrupt their reliance on habit and indicate to them 
that new information in the environment should be attended to and evaluated. And so,
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Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen describe the second neurological subsystem relevant to 
the theory o f affective intelligence.
The surveillance system, like the disposition system, assesses whether or not the 
organism can afford to engage in some activity. Instead of weighing the ratio of 
resources available to the resources needed, however, the surveillance system determines 
how much attention the organism can devote to the task at hand. The surveillance system 
constantly monitors the environment for any signs o f threatening stimuli. When a threat is 
detected, the emotion o f anxiety is aroused, and the attention of the organism is redirected 
from the task at hand to the environment so that preparation for fight or flight can be 
made. The shift in attention to the environment is evolutionarily adaptive because it 
fosters the desire to seek out information that can be used for self-preservation purposes. 
For example, consider a student studying for an examination in the university library, 
where many distracting signs that danger is imminent are unlikely to occur. The student’s 
surveillance system will allow him to devote all of his attention to the book that he is 
reading. On the other hand, consider the same student driving home for the winter break 
during a snowstorm. The student may have difficulty carrying on a conversation with a 
passenger because his attention is diverted by the treacherous road conditions. He may 
lower the volume o f his stereo, drive more slowly, pay closer attention to where other 
cars are positioned on the road and the speed of those cars. Although he may be 
interested in what the passenger is saying, the surveillance system will not allow him to 
ignore the details o f the environment that may be potentially dangerous to him.
The theory of affective intelligence argues that in politics, any sign that an event 
or candidate might be potentially harmful should cause the surveillance system to trigger
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feelings o f anxiety. This anxiety, in turn, should alert the individual and motivate a 
search for information. Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, then, argue that an electorate 
made up of anxious voters would be most similar to the classical ideal of the rational 
citizen. Although it may seem that an anxious but rational populace would benefit 
participative democracy, it should be noted that the constant search for information is 
taxing. Having to spend large amounts of time learning about socio-political events 
would prohibit involvement in other activities necessary for survival and procreation, and 
being kept in a continual state o f anxious arousal would also take its toll, both 
psychologically and physiologically.
This is why human emotion is hypothesized to have evolved into a dual-system 
(Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982; LeDoux, 1995). While one system scans the 
environment for potentially threatening stimuli, the other system, in a sense, determines 
what sorts o f stimuli should be regarded as threatening. Consider a concrete example: the 
disposition system of an individual deeply committed to the preservation of abortion 
rights has signaled to her that she has the available resources to participate in the debate 
and activism over this issue, which (for some reason in her socialization history) is 
important to her. She feels enthusiastic because she feels that she is able to make a 
difference, and that her work is worthwhile. When she hears that a nominee for Supreme 
Court Justice described as having anti-abortion stands by the media, her surveillance 
system notes the threat to her wellbeing, and anxiety is aroused. She then is motivated to 
learn as much as she can about the nominee and the actions that can be taken to prevent 
his confirmation. The extent that she will participate in activities organized to block the 
nominee will depend on how effective she feels her actions will be. If  she feels that
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joining other protesters will help raise awareness and gamer support for their position, 
then her enthusiasm and likelihood of participation will also increase. If she feels that 
participating in rallies would be pointless on account of the likelihood that they would 
fail to engender further support, her enthusiasm will decrease and she is less likely to act. 
On the other hand, an individual who is not interested in the abortion issue at all (again, 
because o f his idiosyncratic socialization history) will not have considered what sorts of 
resources or actions are necessary for being an effective participant in the abortion 
debate. This individual’s disposition system, then, will not keep track o f energy 
demanded and energy expended on the issue, which prevents feelings o f enthusiasm for 
the issue from being aroused. Without enthusiasm for the issue, information in the 
environment about the Supreme Court nominee would fail to be interpreted as potentially 
threatening to the individual’s wellbeing by the surveillance system. Anxiety would not 
be aroused. The individual would fail to divert his attention to the issue, and learning 
further information, let alone participating in demonstrations or discussions about the 
nominee would be unlikely to happen.
The theory of affective intelligence is intuitively compelling, and many analyses 
of ANES data collected between 1980 and 1986 support the conjecture that human 
emotion is made up of dual systems with distinct functions as opposed to a single 
approach-avoidance typology (for a review o f these analyses, see Marcus, Neuman, & 
MacKuen, 2000). These results of these studies mirror Marcus and MacKuen’s original 
1993 findings: enthusiasm and anxiety about the candidates vary in response to key 
campaign events, are orthogonally related, and predict participation and vote choice, 
respectively.
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Additionally, Marcus and MacKuen’s theory is similar to several theories in the 
emotion literature. Mathews (1990, 1993) postulated that specific emotions signal to the 
brain which types o f processes (i.e., threat detection) should be given first priority. 
Eysenck (1992) has argued that general anxiety disorder is the result o f a 
biological/cognitive tendency to be hypervigilant of potential danger in the environment, 
consistent with the idea o f an overactive surveillance system. Mogg & Bradley (1999) 
proposed a cognitive-motivational view o f anxiety that drew heavily on LeDoux’s (1995) 
neurological model o f anxiety. They propose that a “valence evaluation system” assesses 
the threat level o f stimuli (again similar to the surveillance system) through the 
integration of various sources of information. This information processing may begin in 
the thalamus but comes to involve the amygdala, which in turn effects a variety of 
cognitive and perceptual processes, including a “goal engagement system” (similar to the 
dispositional system) which determines if  the individual has sufficient resources to 
respond to the threat.
For the purpose of this paper, the most important conjecture o f the theory of 
affective intelligence is the prediction that anxiety causes attention to be shifted to the 
environment so that threat information can be perceived and processed. A few 
experimental findings support this view. When experimental subjects are presented with 
an array that includes one angry face and many happy faces, they are significantly faster 
at finding the angry face (a stimulus that appears to be inherently threatening) than 
subjects who must find the single happy face in a crowd of angry faces (Hansen & 
Hansen, 1988). Additionally, evidence supporting the theory of affective intelligence has 
been found with techniques from cognitive psychology. Mogg, Bradley, MacNamara,
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Powys, Rawlinson, & Seiffer (2000) paired a neutral image with a disturbing image for 
500 ms, and then had participants react by pressing a button when a dot appeared on the 
screen. Participants responded significantly faster to the dot when it appeared in the 
place where the disturbing image had been, suggesting that participants were 
automatically drawn to these pictures. These findings have been replicated with words in 
both clinical (generalized anxiety disorder) and normal samples using other pictures and 
words as stimuli (see Mogg & Bradley, 1999, for a review). While these studies suggest 
an automatic tendency to attend to threatening stimuli, the authors caution that the nature 
of the experimental tasks are very simple and more research is needed using more 
complex stimuli in order to understand how anxiety affects attention and processing in 
the real world. While people may be automatically drawn to threatening images, it is not 
yet understood if  their attention continues to be sustained by them beyond a few hundred 
milliseconds. In fact, Mogg and Bradley argue that, adaptively, low-trait anxiety 
individuals may block low-threat stimuli so that their attention can be effectively focused 
on the task at hand.
What is needed, then, to better inform both the psychological literature on 
emotion and the political science literature on political behavior is studies that use more 
complex, ecologically valid stimuli and take into account a number o f socio- 
psychological variables. Again, Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen’s work on their theory 
o f affective intelligence represents a good starting point for this collaboration.
One psychological variable that might contribute to the tendency to attend to the 
political environment may be personal habit - individuals who tend to follow politics may 
be more inclined to become anxious or enthusiastic about the candidates. In order to
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measure the effect o f emotions that have been aroused by the current political 
environment, Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen ran regressions that statistically controlled 
for the impact o f individual variation in the tendency to attend to politics on reported 
levels of campaign interest. Once personal habit was controlled for, the effects of feeling 
anxious and feeling enthusiastic on campaign interest both declined by about half. 
However, to put this finding in perspective, 13 associated with feeling anxious was .10 and 
13 for enthusiasm equaled .13, values similar to 13 = .11 and 13 = .12 for education level and 
strength o f partisanship, respectively (effect sizes not available). The impact of level of 
arousal and emotion, then, is roughly comparable to the impact o f education level and 
party identification on campaign interest. To summarize, a good portion of the variance 
in campaign interest is due to individual differences in political attentiveness. However, 
the impact of the emotions aroused by the current campaign also plays an important role 
in engaging the public.
Interest in the campaign, however, is only half o f the story. Effective political 
cognition is also comprised o f the search for new information about political events and 
candidates -  a search that will be motivated by anxiety. A good empirical test of the 
theory of affective intelligence, then, should also include an analysis o f the effect of 
anxiety on the respondents’ ability to answer questions about current political affairs 
correctly. For this test, Marcus, MacKuen, and Neuman used two outcome measures: 
first, the number o f statements that respondents were able to provide about the candidates 
was used, with the assumption that those individuals who paid more attention to the 
campaign and learned more information would be able to recall more information than 
respondents who paid less attention. Second, the ability o f the respondents to judge
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correctly which candidate was more liberal or conservative on a number o f issues was 
used. When the amount of statements about a candidate was regressed on the emotional 
responses o f the participants (controlling also for habitual political attentiveness, 
education, and strength of partisanship), the influence o f anxiety was twice as strong as 
the influence o f enthusiasm. With the more rigorous test o f campaign knowledge, the 
effect of enthusiasm disappeared entirely, but again the effect o f anxiety remained 
significant. Both of these findings support the tenet central o f the theory o f affective 
intelligence that anxiety motivates attention to the political environment.
Additionally, a counterintuitive hypothesis derived from the theory o f affective 
intelligence was tested. Because anxiety is both provoked by perceived threats in the 
environment and contributes to the monitoring for additional threats, the authors 
hypothesized that strong partisans would be the first to notice signs o f trouble in the 
administration that they support. Specifically, they conjectured that strong partisans 
would report higher levels o f anxiety when their party was under fire for declining 
economic conditions than members of the opposing party. After all, these individuals 
stand to lose the status quo in addition to the pride and reflected glory they may have felt 
as part of the dominant political party, and so would become more anxious at the thought 
of losing this special state than members of the opposing party. A regression analysis 
using ANES data collected during the 1980, 1984, 1992 and 1994 presidential campaigns 
was conducted to evaluate the influence of partisanship (strong democrat, strong 
republican, and independent) on anxiety about economic conditions under the incumbent 
president. The r2 value for independents was .86, and .82 for respondents that strongly 
identified with the supporting party, while the r2 value for respondents who identified
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with the opposing party was only .28. Clearly, the results of this analysis indicate that 
being a member o f the dominant party does not automatically result in feelings of 
security and pride, as the approach/avoidance theory o f emotion would predict; instead, it 
results in more intense negative affect when challenges to the status quo become 
apparent.
Although Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen were able to provide empirical support 
for their theory o f affective intelligence through a number o f different approaches, a few 
critical flaws have not been addressed. Perhaps most importantly is their source of data. 
By using the ANES data set, the authors were constrained to the questions that were 
posed to the respondents. Because this survey did not include a direct measure o f the 
specific construct o f anxiety, Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen were forced to use a factor 
that correlated with negative affect items, which may or may not be a proxy o f anxiety. 
The same is true for the measurement of enthusiasm. Because these constructs are central 
to the theory, further work is needed that operationalizes and measures the constructs in a 
more valid way.
Additional questions about the theory o f affective intelligence are raised by 
findings in the social cognition literature. Eyesenck (1992) found that negative affect 
states such as anxiety and depression are actually associated with a decrease in 
performance on demanding cognitive tasks. Although a consensus has not yet been 
reached on how negative affect influences cognitive processes (Matthews & Wells,
1999), Eysenck (1992) and Sarason (1984) have argued that the diversion o f attention 
away from the task at hand and onto the self or the preoccupation with the anxiety is 
likely involved. These findings from the field o f social cognition are more aligned with
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the findings advanced by psychologists Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom 
Pyszczynski (1991) in their theory of terror management.
Terror Management Theory
Just as Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen drew from evolutionary theory and the 
neuroscience literature to create their theories about the disposition and surveillance 
system, Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski also adopt an evolutionary perspective of 
human motivation. They argue that human beings, just as all animals, are instinctively 
driven toward self-preservation. The motivation to avoid injury and death is genetically 
based and strong. Unlike animals, however, human beings have the cognitive capacity to 
understand and be aware o f death. In fact, the awareness that total annihilation o f the self 
could occur at virtually any moment is a continual source of anxiety.
Several studies within the terror management framework have demonstrated that 
participants distract themselves from death-related thoughts following an experimental 
manipulation that makes their own death salient to them (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, 
Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987,1982). For example, 
Greenberg et al. (1994) induced mortality salience and then asked their participants to 
work on a word completion task. This task was comprised of 20 word fragments that
could be completed as death-related or death-unrelated words. For example, “coff ”
could be completed as either “coffee” or “coffin”. If  death-related thoughts were active 
in working memory, individuals would be more likely to complete the words as death- 
related. Half o f the participants in each condition completed this task after reading a 
boring passage designed to distract them from the mortality salience they had just
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endured, while the other half completed the task immediately following the salience 
induction. Participants completing the word task immediately following the mortality 
salience induction created significantly less death-related words than the mortality 
salience plus delay condition, suggesting a tendency to push death-related thoughts out of 
mind as soon as possible.
Consistent with this interpretation are a variety o f studies looking at the effect of 
cognitive load and avoidance of death-related stimuli. Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, 
Pyszczynski, and Simon (1997) induced mortality salience in participants by having them 
write down their thoughts about their own death. Half o f the participants were then given 
an 11-digit number, ostensibly to be remembered during a later part of the study. The 
participants who had the cognitive burden of mentally rehearsing the number showed 
increased activation of death-related thoughts, as demonstrated on the same word 
completion task used by Greenberg et al. (1994). These findings suggest that the 
mortality salience induction activates death-related thoughts, and that cognitive resources 
are necessary for suppressing them. The low number o f death-related words completed 
by the control group that was not rehearsing the number suggests that when ample 
cognitive resources are available, they are immediately used to push death-related 
thoughts out of conscious awareness.
The results o f these studies, and others like them lead Pyszczynski, Solomon, and 
Greenberg (2003) to conclude that “the initial responses to mortality salience is to engage 
in simple, direct, threat-focused defenses that enable the individual to get death-related 
thoughts out o f consciousness” (p. 59). These researchers, then, would predict that 
people are less likely to expose themselves to anxiety-provoking information when their
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deaths are made salient. Instead, individuals are likely to try to minimize the threat, by 
avoiding information related to the threat, minimizing the apparent threat by altering 
perceptions of its severity, or denying vulnerability to the threat. Human beings, 
according to these authors, need continual assurance that trauma is unlikely, and seek 
refuge from the terrifying idea of death. In addition to pushing death-related thoughts out 
of mind, another coping mechanism is culture.
Culture is central to terror management theory. Its developers argue that cultural 
worldviews are constructed and internalized so that an individual can achieve a sense of 
security by feeling as though he or she is a valuable member o f a meaningful community. 
Instead of consciously dwelling on the immanency o f death, humans instead become 
preoccupied with the values of the culture to which they belong. Because many cultures 
give prominent roles to religious systems, individuals may take comfort in the idea that 
adherence to the values prescribed by their culture will result in actual immortality in a 
spiritual realm after physical death. But even for individuals who do not subscribe to 
religious beliefs, something like immortality can be achieved through participation in the 
larger culture, whether through children or even ideas that have left a mark on the world.
Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski posit that culture is understood through a 
cognitive framework that underlies all psychological processes and serves two purposes: 
first, it strongly motivates self-preservation, and second, it attempts to minimize distress 
and anxiety about the world through the control o f conscious awareness and an 
understanding o f the laws and forces that govern it. These authors argue that this 
worldview is a fragile social construction that requires continuous maintenance to 
function. The failure o f the worldview to defend the individual against existential angst
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would have serious repercussions for the emotional stability and cognitive functioning of 
the individual; therefore, the way in which one understands the world must be continually 
defended against threats.
Threats to the worldview may come in the form of competing belief systems. 
Exposure to convictions that run counter to those upheld by the individual make salient 
the possibility that the individual’s worldview may not be valid. Furthermore, exposure 
to other standards o f behavior and cultural values leads to uncertainty about one’s ability 
to live up to these standards and values, which in turn compromises self-worth and 
engenders anxiety. The doubt that is experienced when other worldviews are 
encountered, along with the inevitable reminders that death could suddenly occur result 
in a continual need for ongoing confirmation of the validity of the adopted worldview and 
value as an individual.
In short, the developers o f terror management theory argue that threats to an 
individual’s worldview will cause anxiety, which will in turn motivate that individual to 
protect his or her worldview and self-esteem. This conjecture, coupled with the assertion 
that individuals are motivated to push death-related thoughts out o f mind after death has 
been made salient, asserts exactly the opposite o f the theory o f affective intelligence. 
Instead of viewing anxiety as motivator for both the search for objective information and 
the rational evaluation o f that information, terror management theory views anxiety as an 
impediment to rationality, a force that not only halts the motivation to consider alternate 
viewpoints, but actively guards against it. Terror management theory, then, would assert 
that the anxiety aroused by exposure to different viewpoints in the political environment
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would only serve to strengthen the positions and viewpoints already held by the 
individual citizen.
There is an abundance o f experimental evidence to support the conjecture that 
individuals attempt to defend their worldview when made anxious. One of the most 
compelling studies examined the effect of mortality salience on the tendency to 
stereotype outgroup members (Schimel, Simon, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, 
Waxmonsky &Amdt, 1999). The experimental group of participants was asked to fill out 
a questionnaire that made them consider their own death, while the control group filled 
out a questionnaire about dental hygiene (presumably a topic that would not arouse 
anxiety). An African-American confederate was present while the participants filled out 
the questionnaires. For half o f the participants, the confederate was dressed in clothing 
consistent with the stereotype o f African Americans predominate in American culture 
(i.e., “hip hop style” clothing), while for the other half o f the participants, the confederate 
was dressed in a manner inconsistent with the cultural stereotype o f African Americans 
(i.e, “preppy” clothing). After completing the questionnaires that served as the 
experimental manipulation, the participants were asked to participate in a study on 
impression formation, and wrote essays about the other person who had been present in 
the laboratory with them. The results indicated that the participants in the mortality 
salience condition provided more positive evaluations o f the African American 
confederate when he confirmed predominant cultural stereotypes by wearing the hip hop 
clothing than when he defied the cultural stereotype by wearing preppy clothes, while the 
exact opposite was true for participants who did not undergo the mortality salience
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induction. These findings suggest that feeling anxious hinders objective information 
processing.
A cognitive test o f the effect of mortality salience on information processing was 
provided by Arndt, Greenberg, and Cook (2002). Using word fragment completion tasks 
and lexical decision tasks in order to determine the relative accessibility o f certain 
constructs in memory, these researchers found that worldview-relevant constructs 
(operationally defined as nationalistic statements) became activated for participants who 
were primed with mortality salience words, but not for participants who were primed 
with pain or failure words. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that anxiety 
aroused over the prospect of death can be mitigated by internalizing the cultural 
worldview, and provide further evidence that negative affect interferes with an objective 
search for information from the environment.
In addition to these two studies described above, the effects o f mortality salience 
on worldview defense has been shown to effect a diverse range of social psychological 
phenomena, including feelings of nationalism and patriotism (Greenberg, et al., 1990); 
reporting o f political attitudes and beliefs (Pyszczynski, et ah, 1996); perception of 
outgroup members (Greenberg, et ah, 1994; Nelson, Moore, Olivettie & Scott, 1997); 
aggression (McGregor, 1998); risk taking (Taubman Ben-Ari, Florian, & Mikulincer, 
1999); prosocial behavior (Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002); ingroup 
identification (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; Dechesne, Janssen, & van 
Knippenberg, 2000); desire for commitment in romantic relationships (Florian, 
Mikulincer, & Hirschberger, 2002) and perceptions o f guilt in the legal system
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(Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989), among other constructs 
as well.
Terror management theorists argue that the extensive body o f literature on the 
self-serving bias can be interpreted as evidence supporting terror management theory 
(Pyszczynksi, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003). This literature has shown that threats to 
self-esteem, such as being told that one has failed on a test of some ability important to 
the self-construct increase anxiety. Furthermore, these threats elicit self-protective 
behavior in the participants. For example, participants may deny the importance o f that 
particular ability to his or her sense o f self-worth, denigrate the test or the experimenter, 
create or claim handicaps that disrupted their performance, inflate their descriptions of 
their ability in other domains, and selectively seek information that enables them to 
uphold a self-serving interpretation of the failure (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 
1986). Taken together, these findings again demonstrate that feeling anxious motivates 
the defense of the existing worldview.
Research by cognitive psychologists has also demonstrated that anxiety is 
disruptive to efficient processing. Reed (1977) found that anxious participants show 
deficits in their ability to reason inductively, while Fransson (1977) found that anxious 
individuals exhibit shallow information processing. Memory effects are also well- 
documented; Idzihowski & Baddeley (1987) found that anxious participants showed 
significant decreases in working memory capacity compared to non-anxious individuals. 
Kent (1985) demonstrated that anxious individuals tend to selectively remember negative 
information. In an fMRI study, Erk, Kiefer, Grothe, Wunderlich, Spitzer, & Walter 
(2003) found that state-anxious individuals showed poorer recall for lists of neutral words
34
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
compared with individuals in a positive or neutral mood state. Anxious individuals 
showed increased activity in the amygdala while attempting to encode the word lists, 
while positive-state and neutral-state participants showed increased activity in the 
parahippocampus and prefrontal cortex, respectively.
Blascovich and his colleagues have shown that performance declines when 
individuals appraise a difficult task as a threat rather than a challenge across a variety of 
situations (see Blascovich & Mendes, 2000, for a review). For example, female dog 
owners were asked to perform a serial subtraction task alone, in the presence o f their dog, 
or in the presence o f their best female friend. With the dog present, little or no 
physiological changes occurred and the participants made few errors. Participants who 
subtracted alone showed a physiological pattern (increased blood pressure) indicative of a 
threat appraisal and made significantly more errors, but not as many as the participants 
who had a friend present. It seems that the added stress o f being evaluated by someone 
on a difficult cognitive task raised anxiety and decreased cognitive efficiency. (The dog, 
the experimenters speculated, caused the participants to feel secure in an attachment 
sense, and this calming effect allowed for greater cognitive efficiency) (Allen,
Blascovich, Tomaka, & Kelsey, 1991). Eysenck (1992) argues that anxiety impairs 
cognitive efficiency through an additional processing burden -  anxious individuals 
“worry” or have negative-affect laden thoughts or images activated in working memory 
that impedes efficient processing o f other material.
Additionally, it appears that anxiety can also influence attention. MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata (1986) presented subjects with pairs o f threat and neutral words on a 
screen for a brief period and measured the time it took participants to respond to the
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presentation o f a dot after the words disappeared. Participants were faster when the dot 
appeared closer to the neutral word, suggesting that they were automatically avoiding the 
threat words. This finding is the complete opposite of what Mogg et al. (2000) found 
using a similar paradigm, with pictures instead of words. In her study, participants were 
automatically drawn toward the threat stimulus. Even with automatic responses to simple 
stimuli, results conflict.
How, then, can the inconsistencies in the findings supporting the theory of affective 
intelligence and the terror management theory be reconciled? A look at some 
methodological issues common to both studies provides an answer. While both theories 
attempt to describe the influence o f anxiety on the search for and processing of 
information, both theories use different operational definitions o f anxiety. The 
researchers working on the theory o f affective intelligence, which has garnered more 
attention in the political science literature than in the psychology literature, have relied on 
large databases to test their theories. While this approach allows them to test their 
hypotheses on thousands o f subjects, it denies them precise control over the 
operationalization o f the construct they are attempting to study. Marcus, Neuman, and 
MacKuen report consistent findings that their factor correlated with negative affect terms 
and predicts behaviors and attitudes associated with a search for objective information, a 
finding that requires and deserves further study in order to determine if  this predictor is, 
in fact, anxiety. Researchers in the terror management camp, on the other hand, have 
narrowly defined anxiety to include mortality salience. While this type o f anxiety no 
doubt exists in most people from time to time, it seems unlikely that a preoccupation with
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one’s own death is aroused each time an individual turns on the news channel. What is 
needed, then, is a uniform, valid definition of anxiety that mirrors an affective state that 
could conceivably be aroused during naturally occurring media consumption.
Controlling the definition o f anxiety would allow for the direct comparison of the theory 
of affective intelligence against terror management theory in order to determine which 
hypothesis best describes the influence o f anxiety on information search behavior.
In addition to the inconsistencies with the way anxiety has been operationalized 
and manipulated, the way it has been measured is problematic as well. The existing 
studies have measured anxiety only once, after the participants have been exposed to the 
anxiety-provoking stimulus, and have relied on self-report. A stronger methodology 
would incorporate measurement before, during, and after exposure to anxiety-provoking 
information in order to assess the effectiveness o f the manipulation, as well as use 
behavioral measures.
Additionally, the existing studies have not tested the possibility that individual 
differences exist in preferences for anxiety coping techniques, such as information 
seeking. Research in the field of health psychology, for example, has found that some 
individuals about to undergo a painful procedure (vaginal colposcopy) feel less stress 
when they are exposed to detailed information regarding the procedure, while for other 
individuals, anxiety increases with information exposure (Miller, 1996). A similar effect 
may exist in the processing o f political information as well - some individuals may feel 
less threatened when they have more information about alarming socio-political events, 
while others feel more overwhelmed and anxious when presented with detailed 
information. Testing for the existence of these differences and the variables that may
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mediate or moderate them, such as the ability to interpret and organize complex 
information that may not be structured in a way that is most conducive to learning (as 
suggested by Bar-Tal, 1994) would allow for more variance in political behavior in the 
face o f frightening events to be explained.
The present study, then, advances the literature on political information seeking and 
processing in the face of anxiety-provoking events in three ways: first, it provides a more 
rigorous test of each theory by introducing manipulation and measurement that is more 
tightly controlled than the research that has been published on the topic to date.
Second, it directly tests the theory o f affective intelligence against terror 
management theory, which has not yet been done in the political science or psychology 
literature. Specifically, I hypothesize that participants will seek out more information and 
demonstrate better recall for this information when they are made moderately anxious 
about a particular event; that is, anxiety will motivate a search for information when a 
threat is present, but not overwhelming. On the other hand, I hypothesize that high levels 
of anxiety associated with a sense of personal vulnerability will be associated with 
decreased information search, poor recall for information content, and a reliance on 
previously-held political attitudes and stereotyped information -  hypotheses consistent 
with the current findings on the disrupting effect anxiety has on higher-order cognitive 
processes (Eyesenck, 1992). Participants with low levels of anxiety arousal are expected 
to show less preference for information exposure than both the medium and high anxiety 
groups because their motivation to collect information should not be sufficiently piqued. 
In short, I hypothesize that both theories are correct, depending upon the level of anxiety 
that the environmental context will arouse.
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Third, this study assesses effects of individual differences in the ability to tolerate 
anxiety, which may further our understanding of the processes that mediate the search for 
information under anxiety-provoking conditions. I predict that individual differences will 
be found on the preference for more or less information about a threatening event, and 
that these differences may be affected by demographic factors, such as level o f pre­
existing knowledge about the threat, as well as psychological factors, such as the need for 
cognition and anxiety. Taken together, the aim of these research questions is to further 
understand the process in which people gather the information that will serve as the basis 
for their political decisions.
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Three hundred and two University o f New Hampshire undergraduates were 
recruited from the Psychology Department’s subject pool to participate in the study 
for course credit. The sample was comprised of 68 males (22.51%), and 234 females 
(77.48%). The mean age of the participants was 19.48 years, with a standard 
deviation o f 1.68 years. Freshmen made up 47.4% of the sample, while sophomores 
comprised 27.8%, juniors 15.9%, seniors 7.6%, and other students (such as non­
degree or graduate students) 1.3%. The overwhelming majority (94.7%) o f the 
participants were Caucasian. Almost half o f the sample (49.7%) reported a 
permanent home address in New Hampshire, while 26.8% reported Massachusetts, 
13.9% reported a permanent address in another New England State, 7.9% reported 
being from a State outside New England, and 1.7% reported a home address outside 
of the United States. Please refer to Table 1 for a breakdown o f participants’ home 
addresses by region.
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Table 1
Participants’ permanent address locations
Area/State Frequency Percent
Southern NH 112 37.10
MA 81 26.80
Central NH 26 8.60
Outside NE 24 7.90
CT 19 6.30




Outside US 5 1.70
Although about half o f the sample (53.6%) reported that they knew that the 
Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant existed prior to participation in the study, most 
participants reported that they knew little (34.1%) or very little (44.0%) about nuclear 
power prior to participating. O f the remaining group, 18.9% reported that they knew 
a fair amount about nuclear power, 2.3% reported that they knew a lot, and .7% 
reported that they knew enough to be considered an expert. Prior to participating in 
the study, 44.0% o f participants reported that they were not concerned at all about the 
safety o f nuclear power plants, while 34.8% reported a little concern, 16.2% reported 
a moderate amount o f concern, 4.6% reported that they were very concerned, and .3% 
reported that they were very concerned.
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Materials and Design
Manipulation articles
In order to manipulate anxiety, participants were randomly assigned to read 
one of four passages that were described as “articles that are similar to what you 
would read on an online news source.” The articles were all approximately the same 
length (the mean was 808.25 words per article with a standard deviation of 108.10 
words). Anxiety was manipulated two ways: first, through the safety message 
contained in the article (that nuclear power plants are generally safe, or that they are 
generally unsafe), and second, through the personal threat o f danger (that there is a 
nearby plant that has been threatened, or no mention of the nearby plant).
The study contained four conditions. In the low anxiety condition, participants 
read an article stressing the safety of US nuclear power plants, without specific 
reference to the nearby Seabrook plant. This condition can be described as the “safe 
message, no personal threat” condition. Two medium anxiety conditions were 
included: in the first, participants read an article stressing nuclear power plant safety 
specific to the nearby Seabrook plant. Because o f the personal relevance o f this 
article, this condition can be described as the “safe message, personal threat” 
condition. In the second medium-anxiety condition, participants read an article about 
serious safety concerns at US power plants, but with no specific mention of the 
Seabrook plant (the “unsafe, no personal threat” condition). And finally, in the high- 
anxiety condition, participants read about serious safety concerns at the nearby 
Seabrook plant (the “unsafe, personal threat” condition).
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Measures
All o f the measures were administered to participants using a web-based 
survey on Dell computers using the Windows operating system. The Brief Mood 
Introspection Scale (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) was used to measure current mood 
state (including anxiety) before and immediately after the manipulation. After the 
presentation o f the manipulation article, participants also completed a brief (8-item) 
questionnaire designed to measure bound anxiety - their anxiety specifically related to 
nuclear terrorism. They were then automatically directed to a webpage containing 
links to further information about nuclear power plant safety (described below). A 
software program, StatCounter, tracked the movements within the website for each of 
the participants, including the number o f links that the participant visited, the order in 
which the links were visited, and the amount of time that was spent on each o f the 
links.
After the free-search period, participants completed the Need for Evaluation 
Scale (Jarvis & Petty, 1996) and the Miller Behavioral Style Scale (Miller, 1987) in 
order to assess individual differences in the preference for information exposure. 
Additionally, participants completed the 10-item Brief Big Five measure (Gosling, 
Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) and a measure o f trait anxiety (the BMIS scale, modified 
to measure trait emotion). Although trait anxiety was included as a covariate in the 
analyses, it was measured after experimental manipulation for two reasons: first, 
exposure to several mood state and trait measures prior to the manipulation might 
have enabled participants to identify emotion as a primary variable o f interest in the
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study, thus introducing the possibility of bias; and second, participants’ levels of 
anxiety were somewhat elevated upon entering the psychology laboratory. The 
completion o f the trait anxiety measure at the end of the study may have provided 
more accurate data about the typical emotion traits o f the participants. After 
demographic data was collected, the participants completed a brief (5 item) recall test 
for the information presented in the manipulation article.
Experimental Website
The website in which the participants could search contained eight links to 
articles containing further information about nuclear terrorism. Four o f the articles 
contained safety-threatening information, including how to survive a nuclear blast; 
information about terrorists’ interests in nuclear technology; information about what 
happens during a nuclear explosion; and first-person accounts o f the Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster. The other four articles contained reassuring information about the 
safety and benefits o f nuclear power, including the long history o f safety o f nuclear 
power plants worldwide; information about the economic and environmental benefits 
of nuclear power; an editorial criticizing groups who believe that US nuclear power 
plants are vulnerable to terrorism; and detailed information about the safety 
regulations at US plants. The content of these articles was collected from a variety of 
sources, including National Defense magazine (Stanton, 2002), the Nuclear Energy 
Institute’s website (www.nei.org), books by experts in the field (i.e., Allison, 2004), a 
BBC special report on the anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster (BBC, 2006), the 
website of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (www.nrc.gov), and the online 
Nuclear Weapons Archive (www.nuclearweaponarchive.org). The content collected
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from these sources was then summarized and reported in the format o f an article that 
would appear in an “in-depth” section of a news website.
Additionally, 5 filler links were included under the headline “In other news.” 
These links (about Mexican elections, childhood health issues, a real estate bubble, 
the recall o f the drug Vioxx, and the looting o f the Iraqi National Museum) gave 
participants the option of not reading about nuclear terrorism, preventing meaningless 
search behavior. These articles were obtained through Seacoastonline.com, 
CNN.com, and Boston.com.
The main experimental website that contained the links to the above-described 
articles was modeled on an “in-depth” section of a news website, specifically, the 
BBC special report on the anniversary o f the Chernobyl disaster (BBC, 2006). This 
main page contained a banner at the top reading “NHNews.com” 
and featured a picture o f a nuclear power plant in the upper left comer. Under text 
that read “Is Nuclear Power Safe?” were eight images, each o f which were links to 
the reassuring and threatening articles. Shortened versions o f the articles’ titles 
appeared below their corresponding link images. For example, the link to the article 
describing the events that occur during a nuclear explosion featured a picture o f a 
fiery cloud and the caption “What happens in a nuclear explosion?” The links to the 
filler articles did not contain pictures, and were listed vertically on the left side o f the 
page. Please see Appendix D for a screenshot o f the main page.
Although the content o f the website was written and designed by the 
experimenter, the website itself was constructed by Zachary Ambrose, a professional 
website developer who works for an electronic publishing firm in New York City.
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Procedure
The data collection sessions lasted for approximately 55 minutes. Originally, 
all the data were supposed to be collected in a “super-tech” classroom containing 30 
computers. However, due to limited availability o f this room, data were also 
collected in a smaller room containing 4 computers. Approximately half of the data 
were collected from groups of 4 or fewer participants, and half from groups o f 10 or 
larger.
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were given oral instructions. The
script for these instructions is as follows:
“The purpose o f this study is to identify factors that influence how 
people use internet news sources. First, you will be asked to answer 
some questions, mostly about your current mood state. Then you will 
be reading a news article, something similar to what you might see on 
an online news website. After the article, there will be some more 
questions, and then you will have approximately half an hour to 
explore a website that contains links to further information about the 
article you read. Stay within that one website, and I will stop you with 
further instructions after about a half hour. There will be some more 
survey questions, and then you will be all set to go. Are there any 
questions?”
If there were no questions, the participants were asked to sign their consent 
forms. Additionally, they were asked to record their name, student identification 
number, and instructor’s name on an index card that was selected from a stack of pre­
shuffled cards that contained the numbers 1-4, referring to the manipulations. 
Participants were assigned to the condition number that was randomly drawn out of 
the deck of shuffled cards, so that multiple conditions were run simultaneously. The
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students were then directed to the experiment’s website, given the site’s username 
and password, and were told to enter the number on their index card.
The time at which the students entered their numbers into the website was 
noted, and the participants were allotted 33 minutes to complete the BMIS, read the 
manipulation article, complete the BMIS and bound anxiety measure, and engage in 
the free search on the experiment website. After 33 minutes had passed, the 
participants were asked to continue with the experiment by moving on to the 
questionnaires. They completed, in order, the BMIS, the bound-anxiety measure, the 
MBSS, the Need for Evaluation Scale, the Brief Big Five measure, the trait BMIS, a 
demographics survey, the BMIS and bound anxiety measure again, and then the recall 
test.
Participants in the unsafe message conditions were thoroughly debriefed 
through an oral presentation about the differences between nuclear power plants and 
nuclear bombs, and the safety precautions that would prevent a nuclear plant from 
exploding like a bomb (see appendix A for debriefing materials). The other 
participants were debriefed with a written statement about the purpose o f the study 
and the minimal risks that nuclear power plants pose to local populations. All of the 
participants were encouraged to take a debriefing form specific to their condition 
upon leaving the laboratory.
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In order to measure state anxiety, participants completed the Brief Mood 
Introspection Scale, a general mood measure. Again, these ratings were collected at four 
points during the experimental session: immediately before the anxiety manipulation, 
immediately following the anxiety manipulation, immediately following the free-search 
period, and upon completion o f the other scales used as part o f this experiment.
In order to obtain a measure of anxiety from the BMIS, a principal components 
factor analysis with Varimax rotation was conducted on the data obtained from the first 
administration o f the BMIS. Four factors that were consistent with prior work on the 
BMIS emerged with eigenvalues greater than 1: a pleasant-unpleasant factor, a positive- 
relaxed factor, a negative-tired factor, and an anxiety factor. Together, these four factors 
explained 58.29% of the variance after rotation. Because the fourth factor, anxiety, is the 
most relevant to the present study, the discussion will be limited to this factor.
The anxiety factor, which explained 12.39% of the variance after rotation, was 
correlated with the items nervous, jittery, and calm (reverse-scored). Each of these three 
item s had strong to m oderate loadings on the factor (.72 , .78, and .56, respectively), N o  
other item on the BMIS had a loading on this factor greater than .31.
Unit-weighted scale scores were computed for these items for each BMIS 
administration. The Cronbach a  internal reliabilities o f the anxiety scale for each o f the
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four administrations o f the BMIS were .63, .67, .57, and .44, in order from first 
administration to last.
State Anxiety Manipulation Check
In order to determine if  the experimental manipulation affected participants’ 
anxiety level, two analyses of variance were conducted. First, a two-way (safety message 
x personal threat) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the 4 anxiety scores 
obtained from each participant. Please refer to Table 2 for the mean state anxiety ratings 
by condition.
Table 2
Means and standard deviations o f state anxiety scores
Condition Baseline Post-manipulation Post-search Post-Survey
Safe Message 
No Threat 5.63 (1.98) 5.84(1.80) 5.90(1.77) 3.53(1.31)
Safe Message 
Personal Threat 5.43 (1.72) 5.64(1.79) 5.91 (1.63) 3.51 (1.15)
Unsafe Message 
No threat 5.41 (1.75) 6.55 (1.99) 6.38 (1.78) 3.87(1.30)
Unsafe Message 
Personal threat 5.07(1.94) 6.45(2.11) 6.28 (2.08) 3.69(1.43)
A main effect was found for anxiety across time, Wilk’s A=.21, F(3,296)=362.10, 
p<.001, partial r)2=.79. A polynomial analysis o f these scores showed a significant 
quadratic trend, F(l,298)=461.57, p<.001, partial t |2=61. An anxiety measurement 
occasion x message interaction was also found, Wilk’s A=.92, F(3, 296)=8.79, p<.001, 
partial r|2 = .08. Participants who read an unsafe message showed a significant increase 
in anxiety immediately after the manipulation t(145)=7.93, p<.001, d —.66. Their anxiety 
levels did not change during the search period. After completion of the surveys,
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however, reported anxiety levels dropped significantly from the post-manipulation 
reading t(145)=3.62, pc.001, d=.30. Participants who read a safe message, on the other 
hand, did not show a significant increase in anxiety after the manipulation or after the 
search period; the only significant differences found within these participants’ anxiety 
ratings were between the final BMIS administration (the lowest score) and the baseline 
score and each o f the other administrations, t(155)=3.28, p=. 001, d=. 26, t(155)=17.15, 
pc.001, d = \A l, and t(155)=19.79, p<.001, <7=1.60 for the comparison between the final 
BMIS scores and the baseline, post-manipulation, and post-search period BMIS scores 
respectively. The type o f message, then, had significant effects on anxiety levels, while 
the level o f threat (personal or not personal) did not affect anxiety scores. Please see 
Figure 1.
Figure 1






* Safe No Threat
* Safe Threat
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In order to control for any effect of trait anxiety, a between-subjects ANCOVA 
was conducted on the participants’ anxiety scores immediately following the 
manipulation. Trait anxiety was measured with an adaptation o f the BMIS to measure 
mood traits, and contained the same three items that comprised the state anxiety 
measures: nervous, jittery, and calm (a=.46). Trait anxiety was found to be a significant 
covariate, F(l,297)=40.59, p<.001, partial r |2=. 12. Controlling for trait anxiety, the effect 
o f the safety message was still significant, F(l,297)=17.75, p<.001, partial r|2=.06. N o 
other main effects or interactions were found.
Finally, in order to control for the effects o f the believability o f the manipulation 
article and previous knowledge o f the existence o f the Seabrook plant, these variables 
were also added into an ANCOVA model as covariates. Neither o f these variables 
produced a significant effect on anxiety levels following the manipulation.
To summarize, anxiety levels did change significantly over time. However, only 
one factor had an effect: participants who read articles about safety concerns at nuclear 
power plants experienced a significant increase in anxiety, and their anxiety levels 
remained elevated until the completion of the search period. The factor that represented 
personal relevance of the threat did not have an effect. In fact, even when the repeated 
measures ANCOVA was run controlling for previous knowledge o f the existence of the 
Seabrook plant, the effect o f the safety message was still statistically significant, Wilk’s 
A=.92, F(l,299)=26.04, pc.001, partial r|2=.08.
Bound Anxiety Measure 
In addition to general state anxiety, anxiety specific to terrorism was also 
measured. Bound anxiety was measured three times, each time immediately following the
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administration o f the BMIS: after the experimental manipulation, after the search period, 
and at the completion o f the questionnaires. Because the items on the bound anxiety 
questionnaire might have indicated the true nature o f the experiment, this questionnaire 
was not administered with the BMIS prior to the experimental manipulation. Thus, no 
baseline measure o f anxiety related to terrorism was obtained.
The brief bound-anxiety measure, created by the experimenter, included four 
items designed to assess current feelings about anxiety specific to terrorism. Participants 
responded to the items by choosing the number on a four-point scale that best represented 
the degree to which they felt the following: “anxious about terrorism and other 
catastrophic events”, “afraid o f events that I cannot control”, “scared that my family, 
friends, and I are not really safe”, and “worried that it is only a matter o f time before 
another terrorist attack occurs.” In addition to these four terrorism-related items, four 
filler items were also included in the measure: “satisfied with the precautions the 
government is taking to keep our homeland safe,” “upset about the damage to our 
environment”, “pleased with nuclear power as a clean, sustainable, and safe energy 
source”, and “relieved about the progress that has been made in fighting Al-Qaeda.” 
These items were included to disguise the true nature o f the bound anxiety measure.
A principal components factor analysis with Varimax rotation was run on the data 
yielded by the first administration of the bound anxiety measure. As expected, two 
factors emerged: one that was correlated with each o f the four items designed to measure 
anxiety specific to terrorism (factor loadings were .81, .80, .81, and .77 respectively, for 
each o f the items as they are listed above) and one that was correlated with the filler 
items related to satisfaction with the progress that has been made in the fight against
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terror (these items were “relieved about the progress that has been made in fighting Al- 
Qaeda”, which had a factor loading o f .79; “Pleased with nuclear power as a clean, 
sustainable, and safe energy source, which had a factor loading o f .72; and “satisfied with 
the precautions the government is taking to keep our homeland safe, which had a factor 
loading o f .64). The first factor explained 37.65% of the variance after rotation, and the 
second factor explained 18.80%.
Just as for the BMIS, unit-weighted scale scores were computed from the items 
that were correlated with the factor measuring anxiety specific to terrorism. Cronbach a  
reliabilities were computed for each of the three administrations o f the bound anxiety 
scale. For the first administration of the scale, a  = .82, the second administration yielded 
a  = .86, and for the final administration, a  = .90.
Bound Anxiety Manipulation Check
Just as with the general anxiety measure, a repeated measures analysis o f variance 
was conducted on the scores from the bound anxiety ratings as well. Please refer to 
Table 3 for the means.
Table 3
Means and standard deviations o f bound anxiety scores
Condition Post-manipulation Post-Search Post-Survey
Safe Message 
No Threat 9.53 (2.67) 10.44 (3.07) 8.72 (3.27)
Safe Message 
Personal Threat 9.53 (2.85) 10.22 (3.30) 9.18(3.54)
Unsafe Message 
No Threat 11.71 (2.56) 11.93 (2.37) 10.63 (3.08)
Unsafe Message 
Personal Threat 11.63 (2.64) 11.49(2.84) 10.44 (2.26)
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A pattern similar to that o f the BMIS results was found: there was a significant 
main effect for time, W ilk’s A=.78, F=44.35, p<.001, partial r |2=.23. The trend was 
quadratic, F (l, 298)=80.02, p<.001, partial ri2=.21. Participants who read an unsafe 
message about nuclear power had significantly higher bound anxiety ratings than 
participants who read a safe message, Wilk’s A=.95, F(2,297)=7.26, p=.001, partial 
r| =.05. Between subjects contrasts found a significant difference between the safe 
message and unsafe message groups at each measurement interval: t(300)=6.93, p<.001, 
<7=.80, t(300)=4.08, p<.001, <7=.47, and t(300)=4.19, p<.001, <7=47 for the first, second, 
and third measurements, respectively. For the group that read the unsafe message, bound 
anxiety levels did not change between the experimental manipulation and the search 
period, but showed a significant decrease between the post-manipulation and post-survey 
completion measures t(145)=5.52, p<.001, d= .46. For the group that read a safe message 
about nuclear power, bound anxiety levels were significantly higher than the post­
manipulation reading after the search period, t(155)=5.71, p<.001, <7=61, but a 
significant decrease was observed between the post-search and post-survey completion 
readings, t ( l55) = 7.67, p<.001, <7=.23. Please refer to Figure 2.
To control for the effect o f trait anxiety, a between-subjects ANCOVA was run on 
the bound anxiety scale that was administered after the manipulation. Trait anxiety was 
found to be a significant covariate, F(l,297)=11.21, p<.001, partial r |2=.04. Controlling 
for trait anxiety, there was still a main effect for safety message, F(l,297)=53.25, p<.001, 
partial t| =.15. After the anxiety manipulation, then, participants who read the unsafe 
message had significantly higher bound anxiety scores than participants who read a safe 
message. No other main effects or interactions were found.
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Figure 2






Bound Anxiety Scale Phase
Search Behavior
After reading the manipulation article, participants were allotted 33 minutes in 
which to freely search a website that contained links to three different types o f articles: 4 
articles that stressed the threat posed by nuclear power, 4 articles that highlighted the 
safety record and benefits o f nuclear power, and 5 filler articles unrelated to nuclear 
power. The major dependent variables o f interest were the number o f visits to each of the 
types o f articles, the amount of time spent reading each o f the types o f articles, and the 
order in which the types o f articles were visited.
Preliminary analyses revealed large differences in preference for article type 
collapsed across conditions. The participants had a strong preference for articles 
containing threatening information, measured both by number o f visits to these articles,
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F(2,903) = 56.30, p<.001, partial r\2=.\ 1, and the amount of time spent on them, F(2 
,903)=596.14, p<.000, r)2=.57. Please see Table 4 and Figures 3 and 4.
Table 4
Mean times (in seconds) and number o f visits to websites containing threatening,
reassuring, and filler articles________________________________________________
Article Type Mean Time (SD) Mean Visits (SD)
Threatening 922.31 (373.32) 3.07(1.29)
Reassuring 333.08 (275.84) 2.36 (1.63)
Filler 128.83 (206.26) 1.67(1.87) ______
Figure 3
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Figure 4












In order to assess differences in preference for information exposure between the 
experimental groups, a series of 2 x 2 (safety message x personal threat) between subjects 
ANCOVAs was conducted, with time spent on each type of website and number of clicks 
on each type o f websites as the dependent variables. Trait anxiety was again included as a 
covariate. No main effects or interactions were found; the experimental groups did not 
differ in their search behavior. Please see Figure 5.
Additionally, participants were divided into high, medium, and low anxiety groups. 
The same 2 x 2  ANCOVA was conducted on the time spent on each o f the websites for 
these groups. No significant main effects or interactions were found.
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Figure 5









To test the effects o f behavioral style, participants were initially grouped according 
to the scale within the Miller Behavioral Style Survey on which they scored the highest -  
monitoring or blunting. This method resulted in grossly unequal groups, N m o n itors = 200, 
Nbiunters=36, N unciassifiabie= 5 8 . Rather than group participants according to this method, 
then, the scores on the monitoring scale (the more reliable scale, a  = .64) of the Miller
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Behavioral Style Survey was entered into the ANCOVA models as a covariate. This scale 
was not found to be a significant covariate. Even with controlling for behavioral style no 
significant differences were found: participants in each group searched similarly to each 
other regardless o f previously-existing preferences for information exposure.
In order to assess the effects of need for evaluation, a median split was used to 
divide the participants into high- and low need for evaluation groups. A score of 50.00 or 
greater was considered to be high, while 49.99 or lower was considered low. This 
division yielded approximately equal groups, Nhigh-157, Ni0W=T44). When entered into 
the ANCOVA model, however, this variable did not produce significant results. The 
groups did not differ from each other or interact with other variables to produce 
significant effects.
Participants strongly preferred threatening information, then, in all o f the 
experimental conditions. In order to supplement the results o f the non-significant 
ANCOVAs reported above, an exploratory standard multiple regression was conducted 
with time spent on threatening websites as the dependent variable. The following 
predictor variables were included in the model: state anxiety (SA) scores (the mean of 
the BMIS anxiety scale score and bound anxiety scale score, both administered 
immediately after the manipulation), trait anxiety (TA) scores, scores on the Need for 
Evaluation Scale (nEval), scores on the Monitoring Scale (MS) o f the Miller Behavioral 
Style Survey, gender (coded 1 = male, 2 = female), believability o f the manipulation 
(Bel, coded l=not at all believable, 5 =extremely believable) and message type (Mess, 
coded 0 = safe, 1 = unsafe).
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The regression was statistically significant, R=.29, R2=.08, adjusted R2=.06., F(7, 
275)=3.46, p=.001. The amount o f time spent on threatening websites could be predicted 
with these independent variables. However, the amount of explained variance was small: 
roughly 6%. The results o f this standard regression are summarized in Table 5.
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Correlations between Time on Threatening Webpages (Time), State Anxiety (SA), Trait Anxiety (TA), Need for Evaluation 
(nEval), Behavioral Style (MS), Manipulation Believability (Bel), Gender (Sex), and Message (Mess)___________________
Time SA TA MS nEval Bel Sex Mess B P sr2
SA .06 26.75*** .14 .01
TA -.09 .25** -22.23 -.09 >.01
MS -.13* 1 7 * * 1 7 * * -25.30 - . 1 1 .01
nEval -.16** .03 .08 20*** -9.11* .13 .01
Bel .16** -.13* -.07 .00 -.03 52.35* .13 .02
Sex .02 22*** .10 .00 -.15** .00 -31.89 -.04 >.01
Mess .17 3 g * * * .04 .04 -.09 -.03 .05 -92.45* -.13 .01
Intercept =1397.29***
Mean 928.03 8.36 6.49 6.37 49.84 3.21 a a
SD 371.60 2.00 1.50 1.58 6.11 .93 a a
on R2= .08
R2adj = .06 
R = .29*
*p<.05. **p<.01, ***p<.001
aBecause gender and message were dummy variables, mean and standard deviations were not reported
The t ratios were examined to assess the relative contributions o f each o f the independent 
- variables. Of the seven predictors, three were significant: state anxiety t(275)=2.04, p=.04, need 
for evaluation t(285)=-2.48, p=.01, and believability t(275)=2.24, p=.03. For both anxiety and 
believability, higher ratings predicted more time spent on the threatening websites, while higher 
scores on the Need for Evaluation Scale predicted less time on threatening websites. The 
proportions o f variance uniquely explained by each of these predictors were very small: sr =.01 
for state anxiety, sr2=.01 for Need for Evaluation, and sr2=.02 for believability.
When this set o f independent variables was used to predict time spent on reassuring and 
filler websites, the model was not significant.
Order o f Website Visits
In order to assess the order in which the types of websites were visited, a series o f chi 
square analyses was conducted on the content o f the first, second, and third websites visited (not 
including the main page) by each participant. Although most participants returned to the main 
page before selecting another website to visit, some participants used the back button on their 
browser. This action caused their search behavior to appear out of sync with the majority o f 
participants, whose search pattern can be described as follows: visit to website X, return to main 
page, visit to website Y, return to main page, etc. Cases that did not follow this pattern were 
eliminated from the chi square analyses.
For their first viewed article, participants were more likely to choose reassuring content, 
%2 (n=301, df=2)= 64.07, p<.001. Forty nine and a half percent of participants selected a 
reassuring article first, while 36.9% chose a threatening article and 12.6% chose a filler article. 
The pattern changed for the second and third visits, however: threatening information was more
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likely to be selected, %2 (n=265, df=2)= 111.31, p<.001 and %2 (n=233, df=2)=29.23, p<.001 for 
the second and third visits, respectively For the second article selected, 63.40% chose a 
threatening article, 23.02% chose a reassuring article, and 13.58% chose a filler article. For the 
third article visited, 45.49% chose threatening information, 35.62% chose reassuring 
information, and 18.88% chose filler information. It should be noted that the arrangement o f the 
articles on the main page might have had an effect on the order o f articles selected: all 149 of the 
participants who selected a reassuring article first selected the same article about the benefits of 
nuclear power. The link to this article appeared in the upper, left-most comer o f the links table, a 
position that may have created a positive bias for this article immediately upon entering the main 
site (technical difficulties prevented the website developer from randomizing the position o f the 
article links for each participant). Follow-up analyses revealed no significant differences in the 
order o f content visited by experimental condition. Please see Figure 6.
Figure 6
Order in which participants viewed articles, by content
■  Threatening
■  Reassuring 
□  Filler
First visit Second visit Third visit
Visit to articles after manipulation
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Recall
Finally, in order to assess differences in information retention across the experimental 
groups, a 2 x 2 (message x threat) between subjects ANOVA was run using scores on the recall 
test as the dependent variable. Recall score reflects the number o f correct items on a 5-item 
surprise quiz administered at the end o f the experimental session, A main effect was found for 
message, F(3,298)=12.20 p^.OOl, partial r|2=.04. Participants who read the unsafe message 
(M=2.75, SD=.97) had more accurate recall o f the information presented in the manipulation 
article than participants who read the safe message (M=2.31, SD=1.22).
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
The major purpose o f this study was to determine whether anxiety increases or 
decreases preference for exposure to information about a threat. Prior to this study, most 
work on this topic was conducted within one of two theoretical frameworks: the affective 
intelligence framework, which posits that anxiety will increase preference for 
information, and the terror management framework, which posits that preference for 
threat information is low under most circumstances. To correct for limitations in the 
political science and psychology literatures, the design of this study departed from 
existing studies in several ways: first, anxiety was operationally defined using emotion 
and arousal measures that are well-established in the psychology literature. Second, 
anxiety was manipulated in addition to being measured. Third, because the goal of this 
study is to generalize to search behavior under real threats o f terrorism, the manipulation 
was designed to maximize ecological validity by appearing as similar as possible to a 
threat that might be encountered in the real world. Fourth, a behavioral measure of 
preference for information was included. Fifth, individual difference variables that might 
affect information preference were measured and controlled.
Under these experimental conditions, participants demonstrated a very strong 
preference for threatening information. Regardless of both the type o f message they read 
about nuclear safety and level o f personal threat, participants preferred to read
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information that elaborated on the nature o f the terrorist threat to nuclear power plants, 
and the sequence o f events that would occur if  a plant was successfully attacked. On the 
surface, then, it appears that the theory of affective intelligence is the more accurate 
model o f information preference. Participants collected information that might be helpful 
to them in the future, if  such an explosion should occur. Compared with the time spent 
on the threatening web pages, participants practically ignored information that would 
assure them that risk o f terrorism to US plants is low, information that should be more 
interesting to them if  they were managing terror.
However, this finding is complicated by the fact that, while the groups did not 
differ in their preference for threatening information, they did differ in their anxiety 
levels. To understand the influence o f anxiety on information preference -  if  there is one 
-  other variables must be considered.
In the pages that follow, the relation between anxiety and selective information 
exposure will be discussed, followed by a discussion o f the other variables that were 
assessed in this study. The limitations o f the findings will then be discussed, followed by 
the implications o f the study and future directions for this line o f research.
Anxiety
The present study attempted to manipulate anxiety on two levels: through safety 
message (i.e., that nuclear power plants are safe, or that they are unsafe), and through 
personal threat (i.e., the manipulation article focused on the nearby Seabrook plant, or 
focused on US nuclear power plants in general). While unsafe messages were associated 
with increases in state anxiety, no effect for threat was found: terrorist threat to the nation 
in general aroused as much anxiety as a threat specific to the participants’ home region.
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The failure o f the manipulation to produce significantly more anxiety among the 
participants who read an unsafe message about the nearby plant could be explained two 
different ways: first, it may be the case that the possibility o f terrorists targeting 
Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant is not believable or realistic, especially, perhaps, among 
people who live nearby. However, no differences were found between the groups on 
ratings o f the manipulation articles’ believability or realism. Second, participants might 
have been aware o f the existence o f the Seabrook plant before participating in the study, 
and therefore interpreted the national threat as a personal threat. This explanation was 
also ruled out. When previous knowledge of the existence o f the Seabrook plant was 
controlled, the pattern o f results did not change.
Although scarce, a few studies have examined the relation between personal and 
collective threat. Arian and Gordon (1993), studied residents o f Tel Aviv during the Gulf 
War and found that personal interpretations of a threat increased anxiety. Roughly 30% 
of respondents very strongly agreed with the statement that Saddam Hussein was “out to 
get them” personally, a belief that was associated with higher ratings o f fear than the 
beliefs that Saddam Hussein was out to get them as “a Jew,” as “an Israeli”, or “as the 
Jewish People.”
In a separate study, Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, and Provost (2002) found evidence 
that terrorist threat is comprised of two distinct (but related) dimensions: personal threat 
and national threat. Personal threat had a small effect on behavior designed to minimize 
risk o f terrorism (such as not flying), but did not influence estimates about the economic 
consequences o f terrorism. Perceived national threat, on the other hand, did influence 
predictions about the economic impact that another attack would have.
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These findings highlight the importance o f threat perception as a variable in 
political psychological research. They demonstrate that the perception o f threat can 
underlie economic beliefs, which in turn can influence attitudes toward relevant policies 
-  an important outcome. Moreover, they demonstrate that social psychological factors, 
such as identity salience, can influence the perception of a threat. While the present 
study did not include measures that would shed light on the way the participants 
interpreted the threatening information posed in the manipulation articles, its failure to 
find a difference in anxiety levels between personal and national threats are compelling in 
light of the limited research on the topic. More work is needed to understand the 
processes underlying the appraisal o f a threat as personal or collective, and the emotional 
and attitudinal consequences o f each type o f appraisal.
Further understanding of the processes underlying threat interpretation might also 
shed light on the effect o f anxiety on information preference. The present study found 
only weak evidence for an effect o f anxiety on selective exposure. The results of the 
main hypothesis test revealed no differences between the experimental groups on the 
amount o f time spent on threatening, reassuring, or filler-content websites. An 
exploratory regression found that state anxiety levels did affect the amount o f time spent 
on the threatening content, but only when a host o f other variables were controlled: trait 
anxiety, behavioral style, need for evaluation, believability, gender, and safety message. 
When the effects o f these variables were removed, participants with higher levels o f state 
anxiety spent more time reading threatening content, although the effect was small. 
However, it should be noted that this finding is also consistent with the affective 
intelligence approach.
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What can account for the failure of anxiety to strongly influence preference for 
information in the current study? It could be the case that biases toward negative, 
threatening, and/or emotional information that operate independently from anxiety were 
in effect. Kyrios and lob (1998) found that trait-anxious individuals paid more attention 
to threatening stimuli, but not significantly more than non-anxious individuals. In fact, 
both anxious and non-anxious individuals spent more time focusing on threatening 
stimuli than on neutral stimuli, suggesting a general bias towards threatening information. 
Media outlets seem to already know this, and frequently feature more negative news 
stories than positive ones (Berkowitz, 1991; Shoemaker, Chang, & Brendlinger, 1987).
Evidence to support a bias toward emotional stimuli relative to neutral stimuli 
also abounds. In separate studies, both Zeelenberg, Wagenmakers, & Rotteveel (2006) 
and Phelps and Anderson (2001) found that subjects were quicker at processing emotion- 
related stimuli than neutral stimuli. Additionally, Ferre (2003) found enhanced recall for 
both positive and negative emotion words compared with neutral words. In studies of 
news consumption, Grabe, Lang, and Zhao (2003) found that “tabloidized” news stories 
(stories that were reported in a sensational style, designed to heighten emotional reaction) 
attracted more attention than traditionally reported stories. And Bolls, Lang, and Potter 
(2001) reported that degree o f emotional arousal, rather than emotional valence, was a 
better predictor o f attention to radio advertisements.
The preference for the threatening articles in the current study, then, could be a 
manifestation o f these biases. Participants had a choice between content that aroused 
negative emotion and neutral content, and chose the arousing content for most o f the 
allotted time. The results o f the current study are particularly interesting in light of
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previous findings because they replicate the same effects under experimental conditions 
very different from existing studies. Previous research on attentional biases and anxiety 
have used reaction-time procedures, such as the Stroop task and dot probe techniques that 
allow for the clear detection o f simple approach-avoidance behavior for anxiety-related 
stimuli. While these methodologies are important because they illuminate the basic 
cognitive processes that operate in anxiety, they may fail to capture the complexity of the 
consequences o f anxiety-provoking stimuli in the real world. The replication of these 
effects within more complex stimuli, then, suggests that these biases may operate in 
higher-order cognitive tasks as well.
One such process that these biases might affect is information selection. Even in 
studies that do use more ecologically valid threat stimuli, such as news articles or 
broadcasts, participants are rarely offered a choice in what they will be watching or 
reading. Instead, attention and interest are measured through a mixture o f self-report and 
physiological techniques. Thus, the methodology o f the current study departs from the 
existing literature in a second way, through offering participants a choice o f information 
to view. The strong preference for threatening information may indicate that attentional 
biases toward negative or emotional information are operating in decisions about which 
information to read. Again, more research is needed to elucidate the effect o f anxiety on 
higher-order cognitive tasks.
Behavioral Style
It appears that more research is also needed to identify individual characteristics 
that may mediate anxiety’s effects on selecting information. The Miller Behavioral Style
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Survey was included in the present study because o f its ability to predict information 
seeking and avoidance in other (mostly medical) situations. In the present study, 
however, scores on the short version o f the monitoring and blunting scales o f the MBSS 
did not predict time spent on the threatening, reassuring, or filler websites.
In the short version o f the MBSS (Steptoe, 1989), participants read two scenarios, 
one involving an anxiety-provoking trip to the dentist, and one involving the possibility 
o f losing employment due to declining business. After reading each scenario, 
participants read a series o f statements describing behavior, and marked which behaviors 
they would be most likely to engage in. Some of the behaviors are characteristic of 
people who prefer lots o f information (monitors), while the others are characteristic of 
those who prefer to avoid information (blunters). The marks for each type of behavior 
are added, providing the monitor and blunter scale scores. Examples o f behaviors on the 
monitoring scale include “I would ask the dentist exactly what is going to be done” and “I 
would talk to other employees to see what my supervisor’s evaluation o f me said.” 
Examples o f blunting behaviors include “I would take a tranquilizer or have a drink 
before going [to the dentist]” and “I would push all thoughts of being laid off out of my 
mind.”
For the majority o f participants, scores on the monitoring scale were higher, a 
finding consistent with other studies that have used the MBSS. Because the monitoring 
scale had a higher Cronbach a  reliability than the blunting scale, and also because 
previous research has shown the monitoring scale to have greater predictive power, only 
that scale was used as a covariate in the analyses o f variance on the time spent on each 
type o f website and as an independent variable in the exploratory regression predicting
71
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
time spent on the threatening web sites. In both analyses, inclusion of the monitoring 
variable failed to yield significant results.
It appears, then, that the predictive power o f the MBSS does not translate easily 
from medical situations to socio-political applications. One feature that distinguishes the 
two settings is the immediacy of the threat: the MBSS was normed on patients about to 
undergo a painful medical procedure -  a threat that is very real, immediate, and definite. 
In order to detect avoidance of threatening information, anxiety might have to reach or 
exceed a critical level that, for most people, can only occur under these extreme 
circumstances. It is important to note here that terror management theorists use very 
strong anxiety manipulations in order to find avoidance o f threatening information. The 
failure o f the MBSS to predict exposure to threatening information might indicate that 
anxiety levels were not high enough to necessitate distraction from the threat in the 
present study. In other words, caution should be used when generating the results o f the 
present study to different levels o f anxiety -  it may be the case that an avoidance effect 
consistent with the terror management literature would be found when anxiety levels 
exceed those obtained in the present study.
Another feature that distinguishes medical threats from socio-political threats is 
the nature o f the news. Social norms dictate that information about medical conditions is 
relatively private, shared only with individuals who are close to the affected person. 
News about socio-political events, on the other hand, can be used to facilitate social 
interaction. Following Hurricane Katrina, Procopio and Procopio (2007) found that 
displaced New Orleans residents used the internet to seek out social contact with 
members o f their geographical community and to share information that lead to
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uncertainty reduction. In a time o f widespread crisis, knowing a great deal o f information 
about the threat might be socially (and even evolutionarily) beneficial, leading to an 
implicit attentional bias towards threatening information.
Because o f the proliferation of news media over the past few decades, interest in 
political attitude formation has increased as well. Crucial to understanding this process 
will bet the identification o f variables that underlie preference for information exposure. 
Although behavioral style was not a successful predictor of information exposure in this 
study, more work is needed to adapt this useful construct to socio-political contexts.
Recall
Reading an unsafe message about nuclear power plants was associated with more 
accurate recall o f the material presented in the manipulation article. Better recall for 
these conditions is consistent with the finding that participants preferred threatening 
information: the emotional nature o f these articles may have increased the readers’ 
attention and motivation for comprehension.
This finding is also consistent with the literature on emotion and memory bias. 
Several studies have shown that non-anxious participants tend to recall negative or 
threatening information more accurately than neutral information (Reidy & Richards, 
1997; Norton, Schaefer, Cox, Dorward, & Wozney, 1988; Kent, 1985).
It is interesting to note that the participants who read the threatening information 
also had elevated levels o f anxiety. According to the vast body of literature on anxiety 
and memory, small to moderate increases in state anxiety are associated with superior 
memory recall, while levels o f high state anxiety are associated with decreased memory
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performance (Eysenck, 1992). Thus, the results of the recall test provide further evidence 
that the level o f anxiety attained by the experimental manipulation was rather moderate 
and probably insufficient to induce the cognitive deficits documented by the terror 
management theorists. The goal of the present study, however, was to use an ecologically 
valid manipulation.
Need for Evaluation
Another individual difference variable to consider in preference for media 
exposure is need for evaluation. Jarvis and Petty (1996) developed the Need for 
Evaluation scale to measure individual preferences in assessing positive and negative 
qualities o f an object. It contains items such as “I form opinions about everything”, “I 
want to know exactly what is good and bad about everything”, and “I would rather have a 
strong opinion than no opinion at all.” In the present study, participants with high scores 
on the need for evaluation scale spent significantly less time relative to low need for 
evaluation participants on the threatening websites when other variables (state and trait 
anxiety, monitoring scale score, believability, gender, and message) were controlled. A 
significant relation between need for evaluation scores and time spent on reassuring and 
filler websites was found only when the latter two variables were added together, 
suggesting that participants with high need for evaluation divided their remaining time 
between reassuring and filler websites equally. Participants scoring high on this scale, 
then, demonstrated a slight bias away from threatening information compared with 
participants with low need for evaluation, but did not seek reassuring information.
It should be noted that the high need for evaluation participants still favored the 
threatening information overall. The comparatively smaller amount o f time spent on the
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threatening web pages relative to low need for evaluation participants could be explained 
a number of different ways. First, high need for evaluation participants might have 
decreased their time on the threatening articles because it was unpleasant for them to 
evaluate the content. Their preference for the threatening content lessened after a certain 
degree o f exposure, perhaps due to increased processing relative to participants with low 
need for evaluation. This explanation seems somewhat counter-intuitive, however: one 
would expect people with high need for evaluation to want exposure to multiple sides of 
an issue before forming a strong opinion.
Then again, maybe not. In their original paper on the construction of the Need for 
Evaluation Scale, Jarvis and Petty (1996) cite the emerging literature on the automaticity 
o f attitudes as justification for a need for evaluation construct. The finding that people 
with high need for evaluation spent less time on threat-relevant articles is consistent with 
the vast body o f literature suggesting that opinions and attitudes are largely the result of 
heuristic-based processing (i.e., Khaneman & Tversky, 1982, Converse, 1964). Need for 
evaluation was found to correlate only .35 with need for cognition, a moderate correlation 
which lead Jarvis and Petty to declare that “evaluation by no means requires effortful 
thought” (Jarvis & Petty, 1996, p. 182). Another possible explanation o f the present 
findings, then, could be that high need for evaluation participants appraised the threat 
information more quickly than low need for evaluation participants and then simply 
moved on to other available information.
This interpretation seems more plausible than an avoidance effect, given the 
extensive literature on heuristic processing and attitude formation. The present results 
are thus consistent with other studies that have found that careful o f evaluation of
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balanced information does not necessarily follow from having expressed a high need to 
form opinions.
Limitations
Although one o f the major goals of the present study was to observe selective 
information exposure under real-world conditions, ecological validity was necessarily 
compromised in a number o f ways.
First, the sample was not representative. Instead, a convenience sample o f college 
students was used. A college student sample allowed for easier experimental 
manipulation: a representative group of local citizens would likely know more about 
nuclear power and the Seabrook plant, rendering the manipulation articles less believable, 
and a nationally representative sample would have demanded an experimental 
manipulation that would be both personally relevant and anxiety-provoking to people 
across a very large geographic area. Given the literature on the positive bias towards 
negative stimuli, however, there is little reason to think that adults’ preference for 
threatening information would differ from the students’. However, more research is 
needed to determine that this is, in fact, the case.
Another limitation o f the present study was the restricted nature o f the search 
behavior. Although participants had the freedom to choose which articles they would 
read and in what order they would read them, they were limited to the threatening, 
reassuring, and filler articles within the experimental website. There is a possibility that 
the information that participants wanted most after reading the manipulation article was 
not included in the website’s content. In future studies, including a search function for
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nuclear power information or asking participants what questions they have after reading 
articles about nuclear power could help to ensure that the topics that participants are 
particularly interested in are included.
Limiting participants to a single website also detracts from the ecological validity 
o f the experiment. In the real world, individuals are likely to check other news sources in 
order to obtain as much information as possible about a threat. Limiting search behavior 
to one particular website thus limits the understanding o f selective information exposure 
under threat. Moreover, the 33-minute time period allotted to participants is also an 
artificial constraint. Although participants had the opportunity to read filler articles 
unrelated to nuclear terrorism or to simply rest quietly when they were finished reading, 
these precautions may not have sufficiently prevented meaningless search behavior that 
could have inflated the observed interest in threatening information.
News source may also affect selective information exposure. Seeing a report of 
an imminent terrorist threat on a well known, national news site such as CNN.com may 
influence preference for threat-related material differently than a report on a more local, 
previously unknown site, such as the one used in this experiment.
Another limitation may be the placement o f the links to the articles on the main 
page. Due to a technical difficulty, the links to the threatening and reassuring articles 
remained constant for each participant. This arrangement was likely responsible for the 
preference for the “benefits o f nuclear power” as the first article visited by about half of 
the participants, and may have contributed to preference for certain articles in other ways 
as well (during preliminary data collection, the main page randomized the location of the 
article links on each click back to the main page, but did not remain in the same position
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for each participant. Participants seemed confused by this and reported that they found 
the website unconvincing).
Implications
Despite these limitations, however, this experiment still sheds light on preference 
for threatening information exposure in important ways. The major finding of this study 
can be summarized as follows: biases towards negative stimuli operating independently 
o f state anxiety enhance both attention to and recall for threatening information. 
Moreover, limited evidence from other studies suggests that negative socio-political 
events can serve as a social facilitator, which also may increase motivation for obtaining 
and comprehending negative news. The preference for negative information appears to be 
so strong that other information relative to the threat, such as background information 
about the issue -  tends to be ignored. There is greater interest in the consequences o f a 
possible event than in circumstances that contribute to its likelihood o f occurring.
The implications o f these findings are broad. Within psychology, the present 
study has replicated the finding that attentional biases toward negative information exist 
using an experimental paradigm more complicated than the Stroop task and dot-probe 
technique, answering a call by Izard (1991) to expand the methodology used to assess the 
relation between emotion and information processing. Although these results do not shed 
light on the cognitive structure o f state or trait anxiety, they do contribute to the existing 
literature by demonstrating a preference for negative information in an ecologically valid 
setting.
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From a political psychology perspective, this study indicates that the theory of 
affective intelligence may be the more useful theory o f selective information exposure in 
the socio-political realm. None o f the findings of the present study were consistent with 
terror management theory, which posits that people aim to manage exposure to death- 
related information under ordinary, non-threatening circumstances. Although terror 
management theory has been evoked to explain political-psychological phenomena, such 
as political attitude formation, it seems that a very strong death-salience manipulation is 
necessary to create an effect. So strong, in fact, that real-world applicability may be 
precluded.
Furthermore, this study is relevant to the fields o f attitude formation and 
prediction. The information that a person chooses to read about the possibility o f a future 
catastrophic event may increase that person’s estimates o f the event actually happening, 
which in turn may affect attitudes toward policies and the politicians who propose them. 
Understanding the bias towards negative news will allow researchers to develop a more 
accurate model o f political attitude formation.
Within political science, this study offers two pieces o f evidence against rational 
choice theory: first, participants did not seek exposure to balanced information, and 
second, high need for evaluation participants seemed to be satisfied with smaller amounts 
o f exposure to information. These findings join the ever-expanding literature within 
political science and political psychology on the surprisingly irrational nature o f political 
behavior.
This study has implications in applied settings as well. News websites concerned 
with providing the information their visitors want in a clear and efficient manner should
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consider putting threat-relevant information at the top o f the page or in another clearly 
visible area. In broadcast news, which operates under a tight time constraints, producers 
might consider reporting threat-related information first within the reportings of 
individual stories.
Governments and other organizations interested in dispensing safety information 
will also find these data useful. Within the past few years, the United States has 
witnessed several traumatic events made worse by blocked communication: the 
destruction of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina and the massacre at Virginia Tech to 
name just two. In order to communicate critical safety information, organizations will 
likely find that including threat-relevant information within the context of safety tips will 
increase readership. For example, in addition to urging citizens to create emergency 
contact plans, organizations such as the Red Cross might include descriptions of how 
communication systems can be disrupted. Embedding threat information within the 
safety information is likely to arouse attention and heighten recall.
O f course, serious consequences arise when people are made unnecessarily 
anxious, and so the applications o f the present study suggested above should be made 
with extreme discretion. It would be unethical and, if  anxiety reaches a certain level, 
perhaps even ineffective to use scare tactics in order to achieve a certain goal. Studies in 
health psychology, for example, have shown that arousing high levels o f anxiety is more 
effective at promoting avoidance behavior than self-protective behavior (Janis & 
Feshbach, 1953). The present study found that interest in threat information was high 
when reported in the format o f objective news article. More research is needed to 
determine the effects of sensationalized threat information on interest.
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Directions for Future Research
Because anxiety did not produce dramatic effects on preference for information 
exposure about a threatening socio-political event in this study, more research is needed 
to understand its effects. A good starting point would be the establishment o f an external 
validity criterion for anxiety arousal following exposure to threatening news reports. 
Knowing, on average, how much anxiety levels increase following exposure to real 
threats will allow researchers to know when their laboratory manipulations approximate 
real-world conditions. It would also be useful to obtain lists o f questions or types of 
information desired by people experiencing a threatening report to prevent oversight of 
relevant pieces o f information in selective exposure studies.
Research is also needed to determine how preference for information changes 
over time. People reading about an attack on a US embassy may immediately want to 
know who is responsible and whether or not their own safety is jeopardized, but then may 
desire information about the political motivations for the attack, perhaps followed by a 
desire for information about what the likely repercussions of the attack will be. 
Determining if  preference for information follows a stage or phase-like pattern and 
understanding what distinguishes each stage or phase would greatly aid in the 
understanding o f political attitude formation.
Moreover, work is needed to identify issue factors that affect preference for 
information. For example, while attention is easily piqued by news related to terrorism, it 
seems that more o f an effort is needed to arouse interest in anxiety-provoking 
environmental issues, such as global warming. One factor that differentiates these issues
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is the immediacy o f the threat: while a terrorist threat could be imminent, dramatic 
changes caused by global warming are not likely to occur for many years. Another factor 
may be the controllability o f the event: while there is little that one can do to protect 
himself or herself from a terrorist attack besides avoid certain places at the right time, 
global warming coverage tends to focus on the problem’s capacity to be solved, perhaps 
leading individuals to think that governments and scientists have a great deal of control 
over the issue. Yet another factor to consider is message frame: gain-framed information 
(such as “protecting yourself against a terror attack” or “steps you can take to fight global 
warming”) will likely affect information preferences differently from loss frames (“how 
terror will affect the way you travel” or “global warming will cause widespread 
epidemic”).
The personal relevance o f the threat is another area that needs further work. It 
seems intuitive that framing a message in personal terms (“protecting yourself against a 
terror attack”) versus framing a message in national/societal terms (“protecting the nation 
against a terror attack”) would influence the type o f questions raised and information 
desired by the reader. However, the results of the present study indicate that these types 
of threats do not differ in the amount of anxiety that they raise. Because previous 
research has identified perceived national threats as relevant to policy attitudes (Huddy, 
Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002) distinguishing the effects o f personal and national 
threats is an area that should not be ignored.
Finally, more work is needed to determine if  there are quantifiable individual 
differences that affect preference for information exposure. The present study found 
evidence suggesting that need for evaluation is associated with less time reading the
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articles, but the likelihood that other variables also affect preference for information is 
great. Need for cognition, locus of control, trait anxiety, levels o f media consumption, 
and levels of political knowledge are just some of the variables that should be considered 
in future studies on individual preferences for political information exposure. More 
research is also needed to determine the capability o f the Miller Behavioral Style Scale to 
be adapted into the area o f political psychology. Quantifying individual preferences for 
information exposure has been integral to the field o f health psychology because of its 
contribution to the understanding of patients’ coping abilities and behavior. The same 
construct applied to political information would no doubt also be fruitful.
Conclusion
The present study may raise more questions than it answers. However, it offers a 
partial answer to the questions about political attitudes and behavior under stress that 
opened this dissertation -  namely, that threat elicits a desire for more threat-related 
information. Individuals and groups interested in predicting attitudes toward relevant 
policies or candidates under such circumstances will benefit from knowing that people 
are attracted to negative information that is likely to sustain their state o f heightened 
arousal, and may lead them to over-estimate the probability o f the feared event. 
Immediately following a threat or realized catastrophe, then, candidates who emphasize 
future risk may receive more attention, and policies aimed at minimizing risk might 
receive wider support.
The present study also offers some direction for future research. Specifically, it 
highlights the need to understand the characteristics of threatening information that
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makes it so compelling and the consequences o f focusing on the threatening aspects of a 
socio-political issue. Understanding how individuals select information about current 
events will only increase in importance as information increases in availability, in 
formats that range from traditional news reports to insider blogs to chat rooms and online 
fora. The processes that underlie navigation through this information and dictate what 
material is encoded and applied to attitude formation and change is crucial to 
understanding and predicting the behavior o f citizens, an outcome as important to 
governing institutions as it is interesting to academics, particularly under times of duress. 
“The only thing we have to fear is fear itself,” said Franklin D. Roosevelt. As fear and its 
consequences in the political arena are elucidated, perhaps this statement will no longer 
apply.
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INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT
Purpose: The purpose of this research is to understand how people learn information from
internet news sources
Description: In this study, you will be asked to read an online news article about a current
news issue.. You will be asked some questions about your mood before and 
after reading the article. After reading the article, you will have some time to 
explore a website that contains further information. Just as real-life news stories 
can make you feel uneasy or worried, the article and website may also make you 
feel uneasy or worried, but not more uncomfortable or anxious than a typical 
news broadcast. Participation in this study should take about 1.5 hours. If you 
choose not to participate, you will be given an alternative project to fulfill the 
course requirement.
PLEASE REA P THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS AND R ESPO N D  AS TO  W H ETH ER O R  NOT YOU ARE
WILLING TO PARTICIPATE:
1. I understand that the use of human subjects in this project has been approved by the 
UNH Psychology Department Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human 
Subjects.
2. I understand the scope, aims, and purposes of this research project and the procedures 
to be followed (including identification of any treatments or procedures which are 
experimental) and the expected duration of my participation.
3. I have received a description of any potential benefits that may be accrued from this 
research and understand how they may affect me or others.
4. I understand that the confidentiality of all data and records associated with my 
participation in this research, including my identity, will be fully maintained
5. I understand that my consent to participate in this research is entirely voluntary, and that 
my refusal to participate will involve no prejudice, penalty, or loss of benefits to which I would 
otherwise be entitled.
6. I further understand that if I consent to participate, I may discontinue my participation at 
any time without prejudice, penalty, or loss of benefits to which I would otherwise be entitled.
7. I confirm that no coercion of any kind was used in seeking my participation in this 
research project.
8. I understand that if I have any questions pertaining to the research, my rights as a 
research subject, or any research related injury, I have the right to contact the experimenter, 
Melissa Surawski (Surawski@cisunix.unh.edu) or Julie Simpson in the office of Sponsored 
Research at 2-3564 and have the opportunity to discuss them in confidence.
9. I understand that I will not be provided financial incentive for my participation by the 
University of New Hampshire.
10. I understand that any information gained about me as a result of my participation will be 
provided to me at the conclusion of my involvement in this research project if I request such.
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11.1 certify that I have read and fully understand the purpose of this research project and its 
risks and benefits for me as stated above.
I,_____________________ Consent/Agree to participate in this research project
I,_____________________ Refuse/Do Not Agree to participate in this research project
signature of participant date
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Debriefing Form: Manipulation 1
Thank you for your participation in this study. The purpose o f this experiment is 
to learn more about people’s preference for further information after their sense o f safety 
is threatened. You were in the control condition, which means you did not read an article 
that contained threatening information. Your responses to the surveys and your website- 
searching behavior will be compared with the responses and behavior o f the other 
participants who did receive a threatening message. We predict that individuals will 
differ in the amount o f information they want and the type o f information they want after 
receiving a message that they may not be safe. It should be noted that nuclear power 
plants cannot explode like nuclear bombs, and so would not be considered effective 
terrorist targets. If  you have any further questions about the nature o f this study or the 
issue that you read about while participating, please feel free to contact the experimenter, 
Melissa Surawski, at Surawski@cisunix.imh.edu. Additionally, you may contact Julie 
Simpson at the Office o f Sponsored Research at 2-3564.
Debriefing Form: Manipulation 2 
Thank you for your participation in this study. The purpose o f this experiment is 
to learn more about people’s preference for further information after their sense o f safety 
is threatened. You were in one of our moderate-anxiety conditions: although you were 
reading about a nearby power plant, you received a message that nuclear power plants are 
generally safe. Your responses to the surveys and your website-searching behavior will 
be compared with the responses and behavior of the other participants who received 
different types o f safety messages. We predict that individuals will differ in the amount 
of information they want and the type o f information they want after receiving a message 
that they may not be safe. It should be noted that nuclear power plants cannot explode 
like nuclear bombs, and so would not be considered effective terrorist targets. It should 
also be noted that Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant has an impeccable safety record. If you 
have any further questions about the nature o f this study or the issue that you read about 
while you were participating, please feel free to contact the experimenter, Melissa
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Surawski, at Surawski@cisunix.unh.edu. Additionally, you may contact Julie Simpson at 
the Office o f Sponsored Research at 2-3564.
Special instructions: Debriefing participants in manipulations 3 and 4 will have an oral 
component. Participants will be given the following documents to read. They will then 
be orally presented with the following information:
1. The purpose o f this study is to learn more about the way people process 
information that is scary or threatening to their sense o f safety. In order to test 
our hypotheses, we needed to create articles that would really make you feel 
anxious. Not all o f the information that you read today is true. What you read 
was an article written by the experimenter.
2. Although we cannot guarantee that nuclear terrorism will never happen, it is 
very unlikely that terrorists would attack a nuclear power plant.
a. Nuclear reactors cannot explode like nuclear bombs. They contain an 
different type o f energy.
b. Even if  it did, there are multiple layers of protection that would absorb 
the fire and radiation
c. In the unlikely circumstance that radiation did escape into the 
atmosphere, it would not result in immediate, instant death for millions 
o f people. The effects of radiation are very serious, but not nearly as 
destructive as this article described. In the only nuclear incident in 
history in which radiation escaped, only about 60 people died. The 
cancer rate did increase in the area, but only by 13%.
d. Seabrook has an absolutely impeccable safety record. Although we do 
know that plans o f US nuclear power plants were found in 
Afghanistan, there is no evidence that Seabrook was one o f those 
plants, and there has never been a specific threat against the Seabrook 
plant.
e. Radiation escaping from Seabrook would actually not travel very far. 
Terrorists seeking maximum impact would not likely use a nuclear
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power plant and are even less likely to use the Seabrook plant. There 
are plants that are much closer to metropolitan areas,
f. It is really important to the integrity o f the experiment that you do not 
talk about this study with anyone who may participate. Please wait to 
discuss this study until January.
Debriefing Form: Manipulation 3 
Thank you for your participation in this study. The purpose of this experiment is to leam 
more about people’s preference for further information after their sense of safety is threatened. 
You were in one of our moderate-anxiety conditions: you read about the risks that nuclear power 
plants pose to their surrounding communities. Your responses to the surveys and your website- 
searching behavior will be compared with the responses and behavior of the other participants 
who received different types of safety messages. We predict that individuals will differ in the 
amount of information they want and the type of information they want after receiving a message 
that they may not be safe. It should be noted that nuclear power plants cannot explode like 
bombs, and so would not be considered effective terrorist targets. If you have any further 
questions about the nature of this study or the issue that you read about while you were 
participating, please feel free to contact the experimenter, Melissa Surawski, at 
Surawski@cisunix.unh.edu. Additionally, you may contact Julie Simpson at the Office of 
Sponsored Research at 2-3564.
Debriefing Form: Manipulation 4 
Thank you for your participation in this study. The purpose of this experiment is to leam more 
about people’s preference for further information after their sense of safety is threatened. You 
were in our high-anxiety condition: you read about the [fictional] safety threats that the Seabrook 
Nuclear Power Plant poses to its surrounding community. Your response to the surveys and your 
website searching behavior will be compared with the responses and behavior of the other 
participants who received different types of safety messages. We predict that individuals will 
differ in the amount of information they want and the type of information they want after 
receiving a message that they may not be safe. It should be noted that nuclear power plants 
absolutely cannot explode like bombs, and so would not be considered effective terrorist targets. 
It should also be noted that the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant has an impeccable record of safety.
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If you have any further questions about the nature of this study or the issue that you read about 
while you were participating, please feel free to contact the experimenter, Melissa Surawski, 
at Surawski@cisunix.unh.edu. Additionally, you may contact Julie Simpson at the Office of 
Sponsored Research at 2-3564.
101
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
APPENDIX B
DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION
In order to allow the theory of affective intelligence (Marcus, Neuman, & 
MacKuen, 2000) and terror management theory (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszcyznski, 
1991, 2003) to be directly compared, the issue to be used in the anxiety manipulation had 
to meet three criteria: first, it had to arouse sufficient anxiety to affect the behavior o f the 
participants. Second, the issue had to arouse anxiety specifically about the possibility of 
the participants’ own death. Third, because it would have to be convincingly 
manipulated by the experimenters, the issue could not be one of which college students 
typically report having a lot of information. Over the course o f several brainstorming 
sessions, a number o f possible issues were identified as possible candidates, and were 
then pretested for the amount of anxiety they might arise, the level o f knowledge the 
participants may have about the issue, and the realism o f the issue.
Method
Participants
The participants in the study consisted o f volunteers from 2 psychology courses at 
the University o f New Hampshire, a course in Psychology Statistics and a course in child 
development. In total, 77 students participated in this pretest. Although demographic 
data were not reliably collected (many students failed to report their gender, age, and year 
in school on their surveys), the majority o f the participants were female, underclassmen, 
and psychology majors. In exchange for participating in the study, students in the Child
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Development course earned course credit, while the data provided by the students in the 
Statistics course was subsequently analyzed themselves in class demonstrations. 
Participation was optional for students in both courses, but no students refused to 
participate.
Procedure
The participants were told that the purpose o f the pretest was to identify an issue 
that arouses anxiety to be used in a dissertation on the effect o f anxiety on the search for 
information. They were told that participation was optional and that if  they did not wish 
to participate, they should simply leave their consent forms and survey packets blank and 
hand them in with the rest o f the students. They were asked to read the instructions 
carefully, to include their age, gender, and year in college on the back o f the survey, and 
that they could begin when they were ready.
Materials
The survey completed by the participants was designed to test for differences 
between 5 issues on their ability to arouse anxiety, their realism, and the extent of 
background information about the issue possessed by college students. The pretested 
issues included the reinstitution of the draft for male and female US citizens over the age 
o f 18 and regardless o f college status, contamination o f US food and water supplies with 
chemical or biological agents by terrorists, increasing chatter detected on terrorist 
networks which may indicate the planning o f an attack, the operation o f US ports by 
companies based in countries affiliated with terrorism, the construction o f a bioterrorism 
laboratory in nearby Boston that would house dangerous toxins such as the ebola virus, 
smallpox, and anthrax, and the safety o f nuclear power plants, including the plant roughly
103
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
ten miles from the University of New Hampshire campus. Additionally, the pretest 
contained two brief scenarios involving the release o f stolen toxins from the bioterrorism 
laboratory in crowded, public places and the meltdown o f the Seabrook Nuclear Power 
Plant caused by terrorists slamming a commercial airplane into the nuclear reactor. 
Mostly, the participants used 5-point Likert scales to rate the issues, but they were also 
asked to rank the issues according to how much anxiety they would arouse. When rating 
the scenarios, the participants were also asked to provide ratings o f the probability o f the 
events occurring in real life, the probability that they would die if  the scenario did occur 
in real life, and the probability that people they cared about would die if  the scenario 
occurred in real life.
Results
In order to determine which issue was reported to cause the most anxiety, a one­
way ANOVA was run on the anxiety ratings for each o f the issues. Overall, the draft 
and food contamination were found to be significantly higher in anxiety ratings than 
nuclear power plant safety, the construction o f a bioterrorism laboratory, and control of 
US ports by companies affiliated with terrorism, F(4,456)=17.05, p<.001. Please see table 
A-l for the means.
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Table A1
Means and standard deviations o f anxiety ratings o f pretest issues
Issue Mean Std Dev
Reinstution o f draft 3.14 0.11
Contamination o f food sources 3.09 1.04
Increased terrorist chatter 2.74 0.97
Arab control o f US ports 2.36 1.00
Construction o f bioterrorism lab 2.13 0.85
Nuclear power plant safety 2.12 0.95
Note. xs. = 11
Although the draft aroused the most anxiety, it was also the issue that college 
students reported themselves o f having the most knowledge, M=3.43, s=1.13 and was 
significantly higher than any other issue on this dimension, F(5,456) = 28.34, p<.001. 
Thus, it was eliminated from the pool o f potential issues to be used in the anxiety 
manipulation. The students reported knowing significantly less information about the 
construction o f the bioterrorism laboratory than nuclear power plant safety, Arab control 
of US ports, and contamination o f US food and water supplies. Please refer to table A-2 
for the means.
Table A2
Means and standard deviations for knowledge ratings o f 
pretest issues
Issue Mean Std Dev
Reinstitution o f draft 3.43 1.13
Increased terrorist chatter 2.60 1.30
Contamination o f food sources 2.47 1.12
Arab control o f US ports 2.40 1.40
Nuclear power plant safety 2.30 1.81
Nuclear power plant safety 1.23 0.67
Note, n = 77
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Although participants were also asked to rate how much they worried about each 
of the issues, no significant differences were found.
The low knowledge ratings for the nuclear power plant safety and bioterrorism 
laboratory construction made them appealing because they could presumably be 
manipulated in a convincing manner. Although these issues received low anxiety ratings, 
it may be the case that when more detailed information is presented about them, 
participants would find them more frightening and anxiety-provoking. This hypothesis 
was tested by presenting participants with brief scenarios involving widespread disaster 
caused by terrorist activity involving both issues. After reading each hypothesis, 
participants were asked to rate how anxiety-provoking, realistic, and frightening they 
were using a 5-point Likert scale. Only one significant difference was found: the nuclear 
power plant issue was found to be significantly more anxiety-producing than the 
bioterrorism laboratory scenario, F(l,149)=4.33, p<.05. Please see table A-3 for the 
means.
Table A3
Means and standard deviations for anxiety, realism, and frightening ratings o f pretest scenarios
Anxiety Realism Fright
Std Std Std
Issue Mean Dev Mean Dev Mean Dev
Nuclear 3.89* 1.08 2.68 1.00 3.84 1.14
Biolab 3.53* 1.06 2.57 0.90 3.60 1.05
Note. *significant at p<.05
To further assess the level o f anxiety and realism that each o f the scenarios may 
induce, participants were also asked to rate, on a 100-point scale, the probability that the
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scenario would occur, the likelihood that they would die if  the scenario occurred, and the 
likelihood that someone that they cared about would die if  the scenario occurred. 
Although no significant differences were found between the issues in terms of the 
likelihood of their occurrence in real life, participants rated the probability that they and 
someone they cared about would die in the nuclear scenario significantly higher than in 
the bioterrorism laboratory example, F(l,142)=17.18, p<.001. Please refer to table A-4 
for the means.
Table A4
Means and standard deviations o f the probability ratings for scenario 
occurrence, participants’ death in scenario, and death o f others in scenario
Occurrence Own Death Others' Death
Issue Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Nuclear 33.39 22.25 72.60* 28.14 77.58* 28.26
Biolab 31.34 22.44 53.33* 27.61 63.63* 29.38
Note. *significant at p<.05
Discussion
It appears, then, that when participants are asked to read about a scenario 
involving nuclear power plant safety, at least a moderate amount o f anxiety is aroused. 
Furthermore, they perceive the scenario to be somewhat realistic and the possibility o f 
their own death and the deaths o f those they care about as very real.
Nuclear power plant safety did rank at the bottom of a list o f issues that 
participants were asked to rate in terms of their ability to arouse anxiety. However, this 
task required only that participants read the list of issues, which did not contain any 
further information other than, for example, “nuclear power plant safety (there is a
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nuclear power plant roughly 10 miles from the UNH Durham campus).” The most likely 
explanation for these results is that the participants in the pretest failed to imagine any 
dangerous situation that may arise from a nuclear power plant in the vicinity, while the 
other issues they were asked to rate contained more obvious potential for disaster that did 
not need to be explained to the participants.
The participants’ seeming unawareness o f the potential danger associated with 
nuclear power plants in a terrorist situation will allow the issue to be manipulated 
convincingly. If  the idea that terrorists might fly a jet plane into a nearby nuclear reactor 
had never occurred to them before, the participants may be more likely to feel anxiety.
On the other hand, if  the participants are familiar with a certain scenario, they may not be 
readily convinced that the information being presented to them is factual or even 
believable, and the anxiety manipulation would fail.
Although the results o f this present pretest appear somewhat contradictory, they 
did reveal that the nuclear power plant scenario could arouse anxiety in participants and 
could also be potentially manipulated in a convincing manner, two conditions necessary 
for the study being proposed.
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APPENDIX C
EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION ARTICLES
Condition 1: Safe Message, No Personal Threat
Protests Planned at US Nuclear Plants 
Washington, D.C.
Protesters are planning rallies outside several o f the nation’s nuclear power plant 
facilities on Saturday. Members o f the Citizens Awareness Network (CAN), an 
grassroots organization trying to end the use o f nuclear power, are invoking the risk 
posed to nuclear facilities by terrorists in order to gamer wider support for its cause.
“Nuclear reactors are high-value targets for terrorists determined to inflict large- 
scale death and destruction” read a statement published on CAN’s website.
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, long-standing concerns about the 
vulnerability o f U.S. nuclear power plants have been resurfaced.
Robert Wallis, chair o f the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards at the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission says that the risks posed to nuclear power facilities 
by terrorists is greatly overstated. “Reactors are extremely well-protected. There is 
virtually no chance o f a terrorist being able to blow up a reactor.”
According to the World Association o f Nuclear Operators regulation that has been 
in place since 1966, multiple levels o f large physical barriers must be in place to protect 
reactors. The reactor vessell, which is immediately surrounded by water that will disolve 
any escaped radiation, is encased in walls that are 3.6 feet thick and made o f leaded 
concrete and lined by steel. Three more concrete walls and a steel shield offer further 
protection inside the reactor structure. Finally, the entire reactor structure is protected by 
a dry well well wall made o f steel and concrete that is 4.5 feet thick.
Extensive tests have shown that an airplane crashing into the dry well wall cannot 
penetrate to the reactor. Scientists have calculated the force with which commercial-sized 
airplanes would hit the outside reactor wall travelling at different speeds and have failed 
to find any evidence that enough force would be generated to cause even moderate 
damage. In fact, a test was carried out in which an unmanned plane was flown into a 
replica o f an outside reactor wall. The collision caused a dent that was only 60 milimeters 
deep.
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Furthermore, it is unlikely that terrorists would use an airplane to blow up a 
nuclear reactor -airplanes heavy enough to have a strong impact have wingspans that are 
much larger than reactor structures, making it very difficult to hit a target. Further 
evidence that attacks to nuclear power plants would be ineffective comes from history: 
during the Cold War, in which the threat o f nuclear war escalated, neither the United 
States or Russia used each other’s nuclear power plants as potential targets.
Extensive studies after the only two nuclear accidents in history confirm that 
widespread disaster would not occur even in the extremely unlikely event that terrorists 
could penetrate the thick walls that protect the reactor. Studies after the Three Mile 
Island incident showed that nearly all harmful fission products that escaped from the 
reactor were dissolved immediately in the water surrounding the vessel. In fact, 
radioactive material only penetrated a half centimeter o f the leaded concrete walls 
immediately surrounding the reactor. No harmful products escaped even into the outer 
parts of the reactor structure, let alone the atmosphere, and no one was killed. Studies 
after the 1986 Chernobyl incident, in which radiation was leaked into the atmosphere, has 
shown no significant increase in mortality rates or cancer rates due to irradiation in the 
vicinity of the plant. Furthermore, the radiation levels o f the land surrounding the plant 
have since returned to normal.
“It’s not surprising that some people overstate the concern about the terrorist 
threat to nuclear power plants” said Robert Wallis. “What is surprising is that the 
government has not made more o f an effort to educate its citizens about the reasons why 
the threat o f such an attack is extremely low. To continue to let people believe that they 
and the Earth are in mortal danger from events that cannot cause significant public harm 
is to play into the hands o f terrorists by making a minor event a cause for life-endagering 
panic. Now is the time to clear the air and speak a few simple and scientific truths.”
Condition 2: Safe Message, Personal Threat
Protests planned at Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant 
Seabrook, NH
Protesters are planning rallies outside the nuclear power facility located in 
Seabrook, NH on Saturday. Members o f the Citizens Awareness Network (CAN), an 
grassroots organization trying to end the use o f nuclear power, are invoking the risk 
posed to the facility by terrorists in order to gamer wider support for its cause.
“Nuclear reactors are high-value targets for terrorists determined to inflict large- 
scale death and destruction” read a statement published on CAN’s website.
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, long-standing concerns about the 
vulnerability o f Seabrook Nulear Power Plant have been resurfaced.
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Robert Wallis, chair o f the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards at the 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission says that the risks posed to the Seabrook plant by 
terrorists is greatly overstated. “That facility is extremely well-protected. There is 
virtually no chance o f a terrorist being able to blow up the Seabrook reactor.”
The Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant was built in accordance with the World 
Association o f Nuclear Operators regulation, which requires that multiple levels of large 
physical barriers must be in place to protect reactors. The reactor vessell, which is 
immediately surrounded by water that will disolve any escaped radiation, is encased in 
walls that are 3.6 feet thick and made of leaded concrete and lined by steel. Three more 
concrete walls and a steel shield offer further protection inside the reactor structure. 
Finally, the entire reactor structure is protected by a dry well well wall made of steel and 
concrete that is 4.5 feet thick.
Extensive tests have shown that an airplane crashing into the dry well wall, such 
as the one at the Seabrook facility, cannot penetrate to the reactor. Scientists have 
calculated the force with which commercial-sized airplanes would hit the outside reactor 
wall travelling at different speeds and have failed to find any evidence that enough force 
would be generated to cause even moderate damage. In fact, a test was carried out in 
which an unmanned plane was flown into a replica o f the outside reactor wall. The 
collision caused a dent that was only 60 milimeters deep.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that terrorists would use an airplane to blow up The 
Seabrook nuclear reactor -airplanes heavy enough to have a strong impact have 
wingspans that are much larger than reactor structures, making it very difficult to hit it as 
a target. Further evidence that an attack to a nuclear power plant would be ineffective 
comes from history: during the Cold War, in which the threat o f nuclear war escalated, 
neither the United States or Russia used each other’s nuclear power plants as potential 
targets.
Extensive studies after the only two nuclear accidents in history confirm that 
widespread disaster would not occur even in the extremely unlikely event that terrorists 
could penetrate the thick walls that protect the reactor. Studies after the Three Mile 
Island incident showed that nearly all harmful fission products that escaped from the 
reactor were dissolved immediately in the water surrounding the vessel. In fact, 
radioactive material only penetrated a half centimeter o f the leaded concrete walls 
immediately surrounding the reactor. No harmful products escaped even into the outer 
parts o f the reactor structure, let alone the atmosphere, and no one was killed. Studies 
after the 1986 Chernobyl incident, in which radiation was leaked into the atmosphere, has 
shown no significant increase in mortality rates or cancer rates due to irradiation in the 
vicinity o f the plant. Furthermore, the radiation levels o f the land surrounding the plant 
have since returned to normal.
“It’s not surprising that some people overstate the concern about the terrorist 
threat to Seabrook and the nation’s other nuclear power plants” says Robert Wallis.
“What is surprising is that the government has not made more o f an effort to educate its
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citizens about the reasons why the threat o f such an attack is extremely low. To continue 
to let people believe that they and the Earth are in mortal danger from events that cannot 
cause significant public harm is to play into the hands o f terrorists by making a minor 
event a cause for life-endagering panic. Now is the time to clear the air and speak a few 
simple and scientific truths.”
Condition 3: Unsafe Message, No Personal Threat
Report faults security at US Nuclear Power Plants 
Washington, DC
Safety issues at the nation’s nuclear power facilities are raising concerns after a 
government watchdog group published a disturbing report following an extensive study.
The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) interviewed security guards at 
several plants during the summer o f 2006 and found that they are under-manned, under­
equipped, under-trained, under-paid, and unconfident that they could do anything to stop 
a terrorist attack.
POGO’s findings are particularly disturbing after White House reports that 
nuclear power plants are attractive targets and vulnerable to terrorists. In his 2002 State 
of the Union address, President Bush revealed that diagrams o f the US nuclear power 
plants had been found among other materials in Al-Qaeda hideouts in Afghanistan. In 
April, the White House homeland security budget report identified nuclear power plants 
as a most-likely terrorist target.
“Because most nuclear plants are close to major cities, I’d say that they’re a pretty 
attractive target [for terrorists],” said Ted LaMont, head o f security at the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. “Add to that the fact that many o f the plants are right on the 
coast, which means radiation can drift quite easily. You can see why the terrorists would 
want to hit the nuclear plants. They could conceivably kill millions o f people in a single 
attack.”
Although Congress recommended that security at nuclear power plants should be 
tightened following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the POGO report found 
very little progress in enhancing security measures.
Through interviews with security guards at several plants, POGO found that, on 
average, only 5 guards are on duty to protect a facility at a time. Although armed, the 
guards typically carry rifles -  no match for the automatic weapons that terrorists would 
likely use in an attack. Additionally, they receive very little training on their weapons; 
while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recommends 90 hours o f weapons 
training per year, the average number o f hours reported by the guards was less than 3.
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“When I was in the army, I was trained on the same rifle that we use here,” said a 
guard who has asked not to be identified. “The plant recently downgraded the scopes and 
now I don’t know how to use them. I have no confidence that I would be able to hit a 
stationary target from 20 feet away. Forget about a moving target. No way.”
The POGO report also noted that under current NRC regulations, guards are not 
allowed to shoot at a target that does not appear to be carrying a gun. If a terrorist is 
running towards a reactor with a backpack full o f explosives, the only legal course of 
action for the guard to take would be to call the local police.
The NRC commented that the role o f the guards is merely to delay an attack, not 
to stop it outright. However, POGO has pointed out some problems with this security 
plan as well. During routine testing o f the security teams at eleven plants, mock terrorists 
were able to get by the guards and reach the reactor controls in less than 3 minutes, even 
though the security teams were given advance notice o f the test and detailed plans o f the 
mock attacks. Within another 5 minutes, a highly trained and suicidal terrorist team 
would be able to cause a core-reactor meltdown, causing massive destruction.
According to the very same mock-terrorism test, it took local police, on average, 
nearly an hour to assemble the SWAT team, arrive at the scene, be briefed on the 
situation and location o f the intruders inside the building, familiarize themselves with the 
layout o f the plant, coordinate their communication equipment, and devise and execute a 
plan to stop them.
“It’s ludicrous that guards are dependent on local authorities to help them stop a 
terrorist attack,” commented Paul Levesque, research professor o f nuclear physics at 
Stanford University in Palo Alto, California. “Considering that a nuclear power plant 
houses more than a thousand times the radiation as released in an atomic bomb, a single 
attack at a nuclear plant could instantly incinerate more than 100,000 people. Even right 
here, in my office, about 10 miles from a plant, I would be instantly incinerated. Stanford 
would become one giant, burnt-out tomb. The destruction would stretch from the coasts 
of to the mountains to the cities further south along the coast, and that land would remain 
barren and toxic for decades, if  not longer.”
“The police and everyone else would be dead before they even knew what 
happened,” commented a guard who took part in one o f the mock-terrorism exercises and 
asked not to be identified.
The POGO report asked the guards how they felt about their responsibility for 
keeping millions o f people safe from a terrorist attack. “I think it’s a sham. People 
should know that they’re not giving us adequate weapons, that they don’t let us shoot, 
that they don’t train us. I honestly think that if  a van pulled up and 20 terrorist jumped 
out, the guards would run for their lives,” said an unidentified guard.
On average, the guards at nuclear power plants earn $3 an hour less than the 
custodians in the same plant. The annual turnover rate is 86%.
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Pinkerton Security, a security firm used by 70% o f the nation’s nuclear power 
plants, declined to comment on the POGO report. The NRC, when reached for comment, 
stated that they were in the planning stages o f their own investigation into the report.
Condition 4: Unsafe Message, Personal Threat
Report faults security at Seabrook Plant 
Seabrook, NH
Safety issues at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Facility are raising concerns after a 
government watchdog group published a disturbing report following an extensive study.
The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) interviewed security guards at the 
Seabrook plant during the summer of 2006 and found that they are under-manned, under­
equipped, under-trained, under-paid, and unconfident that they could do anything to stop 
a terrorist attack.
POGO’s findings are particularly disturbing after White House reports that 
Seabrook is an attractive target and vulnerable to terrorists. In his 2002 State o f the 
Union address, President Bush revealed that diagrams o f the Seabrook plant had been 
found among other materials related to nuclear power in Al-Qaeda hideouts in 
Afghanistan. In April, the White House homeland security budget report identified the 
Seabrook facility as one o f the highest-risk plants, given its location roughly 30 miles 
from the Boston metropolitan area.
“Because o f our proximity to Boston, I’d say that we’re a pretty attractive target 
[for terrorists],” said Ted LaMont, head of security at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant. 
“Add to that the fact that we’re right on the coast and radiation can drift quite easily into 
the New York area, and you see why the terrorists would want to hit us. They could 
conceivably kill millions o f people in a single attack.”
Although Congress recommended that security at nuclear power plants should be 
tightened following the terrorist attacks on September 11,2001, the POGO report found 
very little progress in enhancing security measures at Seabrook.
Typically, only 5 guards are on duty at a time. Although armed, the guards carry 
rifles -  no match for the automatic weapons that terrorists would likely use in an attack. 
Additionally, they receive very little training on their weapons; while the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) recommends 90 hours o f weapons training per year for 
each security guard, the Seabrook guards reported getting less than 3.
“When I was in the army, I was trained on the same rifle that we use at 
Seabrook,” said a guard who has asked not to be identified. “The plant recently
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downgraded the scopes and now I don’t know how to use them. I have no confidence 
that I would be able to hit a stationary target from 20 feet away. Forget about a moving 
target. No way.”
The POGO report also noted that under current NRC regulations, guards are not 
allowed to shoot at a target that does not appear to be carrying a gun. If a terrorist is 
running towards a reactor with a backpack full o f explosives, the only legal course of 
action for the guard to take would be to call the local police.
The NRC commented that the role of the guards at the Seabrook facility is merely 
to delay an attack, not to stop it outright. However, POGO has pointed out some 
problems with this security plan as well. In a routine testing o f the security team at 
Seabrook, mock terrorists were able to get by the guards and reach the reactor controls in 
less than 3 minutes, even though security team was given advance notice o f the test and 
detailed plans o f the mock attack. Within another 5 minutes, a highly trained and suicidal 
terrorist team would be able to cause a core-reactor meltdown, causing massive 
destmction.
According to the very same mock-terrorism test, it took police nearly an hour to 
assemble the SWAT team, arrive at the scene, be briefed on the situation and location of 
the intruders inside the building, familiarize themselves with the layout o f the plant, 
coordinate their communication equipment, and devise and execute a plan to stop them.
“It’s ludicrous that guards are dependent on local authorities to help them stop a 
terrorist attack,” commented Paul Levesque, research professor o f nuclear physics at the 
nearby University o f New Hampshire. “Considering that a nuclear power plant houses 
more than a thousand times the radiation as released in an atomic bomb, a single attack at 
Seabrook could instantly incinerate more than 100,000 people. Even right here, in my 
office, a few miles from the plant, I would be instantly incinerated. TJNH would become 
one giant, burnt-out tomb. The destruction would stretch from the coasts o f Maine to the 
mountains o f Vermont to the cities further south along the coast, and that land would 
remain barren and toxic for decades, if  not longer.”
“The police and everyone else would be dead before they even knew what 
happened,” commented a guard who took part in the mock-terrorism exercise and asked 
not to be identified.
The POGO report asked the guards how they felt about their responsibility for 
keeping millions o f people safe from a terrorist attack. “I think it’s a sham. People 
should know that they’re not giving us adequate weapons, that they don’t let us shoot, 
that they don’t train us. I honestly think that if  a van pulled up and 20 terrorist jumped 
out, the guards would run for their lives,” said an unidentified guard.
The guards at Seabrook make $3 an hour less than the custodians in the same 
plant. The annual turnover rate is 86%.
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Pinkerton Security, the security firm used by the Seabrook facility, declined to 
comment on the POGO report. The NRC, when reached for comment, stated that they 
were in the planning stages o f their own investigation into the report.
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APPENDIX D
EXPERIMENTAL WEBSITE
NHNe w s . com
s i l l * Is Nuclear Power Safe?
« families fir* Is Vital Ur* 
in Children’s Health
■ Iraq’s Top Cultural Official Resigns
■ Mexico Section Court to Rule on 
Recount
■ Setting Real About the Real Estate 
Bubble
■ Nerds Sees Successor to VSoxx
NHNmts takes a special in-depth look at the issues surrounding this 
controversial source of energy.
Benefits of Nuclear
Rower




The Threat erf’ Nudear How We Protect Our
Terrorism
How to Survive a 
Nuclear Explosion
*
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APPENDIX E
MEASURES
Brief Mood Introspection Scale
INSTRUCTIONS: Choose the response on the scale that indicates how well each 
adjective or phrase describes your PRESENT MOOD STATE.
XX = Definitely DO NOT feel 
X = DO NOT feel 
V = Slightly feel 
VV = Definitely feel
1. Lively
a. (1) Definitely DO NOT feel
b. (2) DO NOT feel
c. (3) Slightly feel

















Overall, my mood is:
V ery unpleasant V ery Pleasant
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Bound Anxiety Measure
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Instructions: Choose the response on the scale that indicates how well each phrase 
describes how you feel right now:
XX = Definitely NO NOT feel 
X = DO NOT feel 
V = Slightly feel 
VV = Definitely feel
1. Anxious about terrorism or other catastrophic events
2. Satisfied with the precautions the government is taking to keep our homeland safe
3. Afraid o f events that I cannot control
4. Scared that my family, friends, and I are not really safe
5. Upset about the damage to our environment
6. Pleased with nuclear power as a clean, sustainable, and safe energy source
7. Worried that it is only a matter o f time before another terrorist attack occurs
8. Relieved about the progress that has been made in fighting Al-Qaeda






1. I form opinions about everything
2. I prefer to avoid taking extreme positions
3. It is very important for me to hold strong opinions
4. I want to know exactly what is good and bad about everything
5. I often prefer to remain neutral about complex issues
6. If  something does not affect me, I do not usually determine if  it is good or bad
7. I enjoy strongly liking and disliking new things
8. There are many things for which I do not have a preference
9. It bothers me to remain neutral
10.1 like to have strong opinions even when I am not personally involved
11.1 have many more opinions than the average person
12.1 would rather have a strong opinion than no opinion at all
13.1 pay a lot o f attention to whether things are good or bad
14.1 only form strong opinions if  I have to
15.1 like to decide that new things are really good or bad
16.1 am pretty much indifferent to many important issues
Brief Mood Introspection Scale - Trait
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Now, we are going to ask you about your moods in general. We want to know what 
kinds o f mood you feel most often.
INSTRUCTIONS: Choose the response on the scale that indicates how well each 
adjective or phrase describes how you usually feel
1 = I never feel this way on a regular basis 
2 - 1  rarely feel this way on a regular basis 
3 = Sometimes I feel this way on a regular basis 
4 = 1  frequently feel this way on a regular basis
17. Lively
a. (1)1 never feel this way on a regular basis
b. (2) I rarely feel this way on a regular basis
c. (3) Sometimes I feel this way on a regular basis

















On a regular basis, my mood is usually:
Very unpleasant . Very Pleasant
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Brief Big Five Personality Measure
Here are a number o f personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please chose a 
number for each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree that the 
statement describes you. You should rate the extent to which the pair  o f traits applies to 
you, even if  one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.
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strongly moderately neither agree moderately strongly
disagree disagree nor disagree agree agree
1 2 3 4 5
I myself as:
1.  Extraverted, enthusiastic
2.  Critical, quarrelsome
3 . Dependable, self-disciplined
4 . Anxious, easily upset
5 . Open to new experiences, complex
6 . Reserved, quiet
7 . Sympathetic, warm
8 . Disorganized, careless
9. Calm, emotionally stable
10 ._____ Conventional, uncreative
Miller Behavioral Style Scale
Permission not granted to reprint.
Demographic Questionnaire
Some further questions about you
1. Demographics




b. 2. How old are you?
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vi. Other (including non-degree)






e. 5. Are you of Hispanic descent?
i. Yes
ii. No
f. 6. Have you lived the majority o f your life in the United States?
i. Yes
ii. No
g. 7. If  not, how long ago did you move to the United States?
i. Y ears_____
ii. Months
h. 8. Is English your first language?
i. Yes
ii. No
i. 9. Which of the following statements best describes where your permanent 
(home) address is?
i. Southern New Hampshire
ii. Central New Hampshire





viii. Another State outside o f New England
ix. Another country









b. 12. Do you know anyone who works at the Seabrook Nuclear Facility?
i. Yes
ii. No
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iii. A fair amount
iv. A lot
v. Enough to be considered an expert
e. 15. Before today, how concerned were you about the safety o f nuclear 
power plants?
i. Not concerned at all




f. 16. After reading the articles in this study, how concerned are you about 
the safety o f nuclear power plants?
i. Not concerned at all




g. 17. Do you think an accident is likely to occur at Seabrook Nuclear Power 
Plant?





h. 18. Do you think a terrorist attack is likely to occur at Seabrook Nuclear 
Power Plant?





i. 19. Generally, how believable was the information on the website that you 
read today for this study?





j. 20. Generally, how realistic was the website that you read today for the 
study?
i. Not at all realistic
ii. Somewhat realistic
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a. 21. Generally, how much time do you spend a day watching television 
new s? minutes
b. 22. How much time do you spend a day reading about the news on internet 
websites? minutes
c. 23. How much time do you spend listening to the news on the radio?
 minutes
d. 24. When you are reading, listening to, or watching the news, what section 

















iv. Talking to friends and family
v. College or University classes
vi. Other source
4. Political demographics
a. 26. Have you ever voted?
i. Yes
ii. No
b. 27. If  you have voted, have you ever voted for a Democratic candidate?
i. Yes
ii. No
c. 28. If you have voted, have you ever voted for a Republican candidate?
i. Yes
ii. No
d. 29. If  you have voted, have you ever voted for an independent candidate?
i. Yes
ii. No
e. 30. If you have voted, have you ever voted for a Green Party candidate?
i. Yes
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ii. No




iv. I don’t know
g. 32. Which o f the following terms best characterizes your political beliefs?
i. Very liberal
ii. Liberal
iii. Middle of the road
iv. Conservative
v. Very conservative
vi. I don’t know
h. 33. Insert party affiliation measure here -waiting for scales
5. Do you have any thoughts about this study that you think the experimenters 
would find useful? Please share them with us here!:
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